Binding Contestation: How Party-Military Relations Influence Democratization

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Abstract

From setting restrictions on popular sovereignty and open contestation, to yielding entirely to civilians, there is substantial variation in how militaries behave in transitions from military rule. I argue that the extent to which a military sets parameters on electoral and political institutions during a regime transition, what I call bounded democratization, is a function of a military’s confidence that parties will protect the military’s corporate interests following the transition. A military’s confidence in political parties is influenced by the degree of trust between the parties and the military, the institutionalization of the incumbent party, as well as the electoral and political strength of the incumbent party. When these factors are high, the military’s confidence increases and it becomes more willing to yield to civilian parties. Using comparative historical analysis on a paired comparison of Indonesia and Paraguay I test the causal mechanisms and then use quantitative models to show that the mechanisms are generalizable.

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When considering democratization, a key dilemma for the military is securing credible commitments that their institutional interests will be secured following a transition. Democratization reduces a military’s control over its own interests and may re-expose it to the same issues that enticed it out of the barracks in the first place. If democratization creates uncertainty surrounding the security of the military’s interests, why do some militaries support democratization while others do not? I argue that the military’s support for democratization is a strategic decision shaped by its relationship with political parties.

Democracy without parties is unthinkable (Schattschneider, 1942), yet parties cannot sustain democracy without the military’s consent due to the military’s control of coercive force. The issue of the military deferring to parties is most pronounced when the party’s and military’s interests diverge. When the military lacks confidence that its interests will be secure it constrains parties by setting parameters on political and electoral institutions. By shaping institutions, the military creates credible commitments that parties will not violate its interests. While some militaries directly intervene in politics to subvert political parties’ control over terms of the transition, others are more willing to yield to parties when they are confident that a shift to democracy will not endanger their core interests. I argue that a military’s confidence is shaped by three factors: trust in civilian parties, the institutionalization of an incumbent party, and the strength of the incumbent party.

A military is confident that civilian rule will not endanger its interests if it has an allied party in the party system that advocates on the military’s behalf. Even if the military trusts a party, it must expect that the party can survive the transition and garner sufficient power to protect its interests. Thus, the military’s partisan ally must also be institutionalized and demonstrate electoral and political strength.

When the military has an allied party it trusts, which is institutionalized and strong, the military’s confidence in parties increases along with its support for democratization. When the military’s lacks confidence in parties, the military sets parameters on democracy by
imposing specific restrictions on electoral and political institutions, procedures, and actors. Should the military constrain parties, the military engages in what I call *bounded democratization*. Bounded democratization may produce a democratic system, but whose institutions are designed to prevent certain parties from gaining sufficient power to endanger the military’s interests. Bounded democratization may also result in a competitive authoritarian regime, where contestation and participation are sufficiently restrictive that the military’s opponents do not stand a reasonable chance at winning or exercising power.

The literature on comparative authoritarianism and democratization has given significant attention to the military, keying in on how militaries seek specific protections for prerogatives within its own traditional sphere (*Stepan, 2015*; *Hunter, 1997*; *Loveman, 1994*; *Agüero, 1998*). I contribute to this literature by highlighting the strategic interaction between the military and parties, demonstrating that the military does not need to act unilaterally to secure its interests when it is confident that parties will govern on its behalf. Understanding why a military shapes political institutions is key to explaining variation in democratic development, which is a literature dominated by explanations centered on civilian actors (*Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006*; *Boix, 2003*; *Ansell and Samuels, 2014*; *Riedl et al., 2020*; *Slater and Wong, 2013*; *Ziblatt, 2017*; *Putnam, 1994*; *Przeworski, 1991*; *Przeworski et al., 2000*; *Inglehart, 1997*; *Moore, 1993*; *Lipset, 1959*; *Haggard and Kaufman, 2018*).

I begin this paper by outlining some previous work on democratization and then situate how the concept of bounded democratization builds on this literature. I then present a theory which explains variation in militaries’ confidence in parties. Following the discussion on the theory, I outline a mix-methods research design to test the theory, present the results, and then conclude.

**Returning the Focus to the Military**

Democratization has a central place in comparative politics, with a rich literature exploring explanations varying from structural (*Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006*; *Ansell and Samuels, 2014*; *Boix, 2003*), cultural (*Lipset, 1959*; *Inglehart, 1997*), authoritarian-led (*Slater and...*)
Wong, 2013; Ziblatt, 2017; Riedl et al., 2020), and elite-agency (O’Donnell et al., 1986) theories of democratization. Beyond these explanations many incorporate the military into their analysis. Those that incorporate the military highlight how the military’s characteristics situate it as a unique political actor that does not share the same characteristics or incentives as other traditional political actors (Geddes, 1999; Stepan, 1989). The characteristics of the military have been used to explain regime durability and whether there is even a chance of democratization (Bellin, 2004, 2012). Should authoritarianism fail, the question of demobilizing the military is crucial for the prospects of democracy (Bunce, 2003), as the military may maintain specific missions (Arceneaux, 2001), prerogatives (Hunter, 1997; Stepan, 2015), autonomy (Pion-Berlin, 1992), or even leave specific legacies (Agüero, 1998). But too often these approaches overlook the military’s relationship with organized parties and how this relationship shapes the military’s behavior.

The military is given significant attention largely due to its monopolization of coercive force and capacity to unilaterally derail democratization. The military’s coercive power is not the sole justification for greater emphasis on the military. One defining feature of political regimes in the post-WWII era was the proliferation of military-backed regimes. Military rule was common after WWII, reaching nearly 50% of all regimes at its peak (Geddes et al., 2014; Wahman et al., 2013; Przeworski et al., 2000; Svolik, 2012). Because the military played such a prominent political role, and continues to do so today, we should use greater care with the scope of inquiry when developing theoretical frameworks to address democratization. Patterns of democratization differ significantly for systems emerging from military rather than civilian rule (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Theories of democratization that ignore the military cannot adequately explain the historical development of democracies which emerged from failed military regimes.

To explain how the military’s behavior during democratization is a function of its relationship with parties, I use a concept which I term bounded democratization. I define bounded democratization as a transition towards a more competitive system wherein the military sets
parameters on electoral and political institutions or actors to constrain open contestation and popular sovereignty. For a transition to qualify as bounded or unbounded, there must be a shift to a system in which elections are used to select those in power, and where there is at least nominal decentralization of power between a legislature and the chief executive.

Bounded democratization can vary by degree and ranges from the military taking a minimal role in developing political institutions, to the military taking an active role where it develops formal institutions and requires explicit concessions from civilians in exchange for its depoliticization. While the military allows democratic-like procedures and institutions, the bounds it sets may be sufficiently restrictive that the system fails to meet a minimalist definition of democracy, even if more competitive than the antecedent regime. I use the concept of bounded democratization to improve our understanding of how the resulting quality of democracy can vary, even if the transition passed thresholds for procedural democracy under minimalist conceptions (Dahl, 1973; Schumpeter, 2010; Przeworski et al., 2000).

**Civilians Versus Military Actors**

Over time, work has turned from conceptualizing more ideal forms of authoritarianism (Arendt, 1973; Moore, 1993; Linz, 1985) to authoritarian regimes which incorporate democratic-like institutions, such as tutelary democracy (Loveman, 1994), illiberal democracy (Diamond, 2015), and a plethora of other concepts of democracy with adjectives (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). The proliferation of concepts arose from the difficulty of describing regimes which are more competitive than ideal forms of authoritarian rule, but still fall short of minimalist definitions of democracy. The difficulty of conceptualizing these regimes was addressed, in part, by Levitsky and Way (2010). With the concept of competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way highlighted how some aspects of democratic rule may be present, but the political playing field is tilted beyond a reasonable advantage for the incumbents.

Levitsky and Way argued that the pathway to competitive authoritarianism is shaped by **civilian** incumbent parties using their power to tilt the playing field to guarantee power for themselves. Yet many regimes, including competitive authoritarian regimes, develop as the
military uses its power to *exclude certain actors from power*, rather than guarantee seats of power for themselves.

The military behaves differently than civilian parties because its political interests differ. Where civilians are concerned with monopolizing power for themselves, a military’s political interests center around fulfilling its war-making mission, and thus is more concerned with preventing parties which would undermine its mission from winning political power. Militaries would prefer that allies win power, but too often the military lacks a strong relationship with a party, or its allies are too weak to win power. When the military is concerned with who will win power, it binds democracy to prevent certain actors from winning elections, or exercising power freely should its opponents win power. I take care to distinguish between civilian and military actors because the military can wield its coercive power to set restrictions on who can contest elections, how votes are translated into power, and how power is shared following elections, in a way which leads to a competitive authoritarian system that looks similar to those created by civilians, but which was created and is upheld in distinct ways. I visualize this difference in Figure 1 below.

Table 1: Forms of Civilian and Military Competitive Authoritarianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictions on Contestation</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Competitive Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Competitive Authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Incumbent tilts playing field</td>
<td>• Military sets parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Level playing field</td>
<td>• Level playing field</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have thought of competitive authoritarianism as composing solely the left half of this 2x2, where competitive authoritarian regimes are situated against a democratic ideal, but wherein the regime was shaped by civilian incumbents. This approach ignores the meaningful distinction between the regimes which emerge following military rule. I contribute to our
understanding of democratization by demonstrating that we indeed have multiple quadrants. With an updated conceptualization of competitive authoritarianism, within the framework of bounded democracy, we can account for how militaries set parameters on regime transitions, which results in a system ranging between the two quadrants in the right-half.

It is important to distinguish the concept of competitive authoritarianism by the paths out of authoritarian rule because it demonstrates the role strong or institutionalized parties can play. For Levitsky and Way, the presence of strong parties increases the likelihood of an outcome falling in the upper-left of the quadrant. I argue that the presence of a strong or institutionalized party increases the likelihood that the outcome falls in the lower-right quadrant when emerging from military rule.

**Bounded Democratization and Other Concepts of Democracy**

Bounded democratization is conceptually distinct from other types of transitions which have been developed elsewhere in the literature. The concept of “pacted” transitions evolved from the debate on strategic transitions towards democratization (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stepan, 1989, 1997; O’Donnell et al., 1986). These transitions are characterized by an explicit agreement between regime insiders and their opponents over the conditions of a democratic transition. Pacted transitions differ from ruptures or collapses, where the opposition sweeps into power (Munck and Leff, 1999). Both these concepts fail to account for authoritarian-led democratization where incumbents control democratization (Riedl et al., 2020). It is under incumbent-led democratization where bounded democratization is most likely, but bounded democratization differs from recent conceptualizations of incumbent-led democratization because of the centrality of the military’s role.

Bounded democratization is also conceptually distinct from protected or tutelary democracy. Loveman (1994) conceptualizes protected democracy as a system where there are free and fair elections, but where elected officials are not free to govern independent of the military. Tutelary democracy and bounded democratization differ primarily in how the military uses its power to influence civilian politicians. Under tutelary democracy, the military uses
implicit or explicit threats to coerce civilians to govern in a way that aligns with the military’s interests. Under bounded democratization, the military shapes institutions to bias the procedures used to select those in power and how power is shared. Rather than directly influencing the decisions of civilians, the military sets parameters on who can contest elections, the institutions which are used to select political officials, and how power is formally shared following elections, to indirectly shape civilian’s behavior.

When Militaries Tie the Hands of Civilians

Democracy introduces uncertainty concerning electoral and political outcomes, yet the institutional framework, and the resources actors within the system have, generates some certainty about the range of possible outcomes (Przeworski, 1991). If the military perceives danger to its interests within the range of certain uncertainties, or that the range of possible outcomes is too large, the military uses its power to reduce the range of uncertainty.

To explain why militaries bind democratization I focus on three key factors which shape the military’s behavior; the degree of trust the military has with a given political party, the degree of institutionalization of the authoritarian incumbent party, and the electoral and political strength of the incumbent party. Combined, these three factors influence the military’s confidence in civilian parties and its expectations of who will win power.

For the military to be confident that parties will not violate the military’s corporate interests it must first trust some of the parties in the system. By trust I mean the expectation that a party will act on the military’s behalf. Military’s are more likely to trust parties that share their interests, a vision of the national project, an ethnic identity, or ideology. Most important for trust, however, is a developed relationship over repeated interaction. Senior officers are more likely to trust politicians they have worked closely with and when the officers are certain of the politicians’ worldview. If the incumbent party, or other parties, hold the military’s trust, the military becomes more confident that these parties will govern in a way that protects the military’s interests.

While trust is important, it does not help shape expectations of which party will come
to power nor how effective a party will be should it win power. Thus, the degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party is critical because it helps the military know whether the incoming party system will include an ally. I define an institutionalized party as one in which the party has control of its own internal procedures (Meng, 2017), its processes are routinized (Bizzarro et al., 2017), its organization is broad and stable (Self and Hicken, 2018), and that has capacity for national-level mobilization (Riedl et al., 2020).

The degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party reduces uncertainty for the military because it affects the ability of the incumbent party to survive a regime transition and electoral cycles. Institutionalized parties are more likely to survive the end of the regime than parties which were personalist vehicles for the ruler due to their autonomy and routinization (Meng, 2017). Institutionalized parties also improve their odds at surviving regime transitions if they have a social base they can draw on for support through clientelistic or programmatic linkages. Additionally, institutionalized parties are less prone to radical shifts in policy programs and leadership. Should the authoritarian incumbent party survive the transition, it also anchors and stabilizes the subsequent party system (Grzymala-Busse, 2002; LeBas, 2011; Riedl, 2014; Self and Hicken, 2018).

I center the theoretical framework around the presence of an institutionalized party, but in many circumstances incumbent militaries do not form political parties until democratization is imminent, or the military simply fails to build a party. When the military lacks an allied party, or the allied party is new, the uncertainty surrounding the military’s future is greater and reduces its confidence in the party system.

While the degree of institutionalization affects a party’s stability, it does not endow a party with the strength to win and hold power. Thus, the strength of the party also matters. By strength I mean the scope of the parties hold on sub-national and national political office and ability to govern independent of the military. The military can evaluate a party’s strength by looking to history and determining whether the party was able to win elections or hold power without the military’s interference.
I argue that militaries use bounded democratization when faced with the uncertainty inherent in regime transitions. Because transitions often take place in the context of elite coalition breakdowns, economic contraction, or popular unrest, the military looks for factors which reduce uncertainty. The volatility of a transition means that there is no guarantee that the constraints the military imposes will be enforceable, but binding democratization is a strategic decision the military can make in attempt to make commitments credible.

The three factors outlined above affect the degree of uncertainty the military faces when considering democratization. It may be, however, that there is little uncertainty and the military knows which parties will win power. Even when the military is certain about electoral outcomes, it acts in a similar fashion to bind the power of opposition parties if it is certain opponents will win power. Thus, instead of solely relating the military’s behavior to uncertainty, I explain bounded democratization as a function of the military’s confidence that parties will not violate its core interests. If there is a high degree of uncertainty about how politics will look in the future, the military will have low confidence that its interests will be secure after democratization. Similarly, if the military is certain that democracy will bring opponents to power, it will also have low confidence that its interests will be secure should it return to the barracks without binding democratization.

This is not to say that the military faces no costs for its decisions. A military must weigh the costs of various strategies, ranging from violent repression, to retreating to the barracks and yielding entirely to civilians. Each decision the military makes carries with it some cost, but binding democratization is a strategy the military pursues when the costs of using repression or retreating are both high and when the military can reasonably expect to secure its interests in a more competitive system.

I visualize the theory in Figure 1 below. On the left are the three background conditions which affect the military’s confidence in civilian rule. Together, these factors influence the likelihood the military uses its power to influence the regime transition, with the possibility of either a bounded or unbounded transition.
As a note on military institutionalization and corporate interests, I assume that militaries are institutionalized, with a well-defined and stable command hierarchy and cohesive officer corps. I assume a relatively high degree of cohesion within the officer corps to demonstrate how the logic of a party-military relationship alters the military’s behavior as the party’s characteristics vary. It is certainly the case that the military’s behavior is also a function of internal dynamics, and likely to change depending on which set of officers control the military’s hierarchy. It may be that the command hierarchy breaks down and junior officers rebel, or that there is significant factionalism within the officer corps. These circumstances often lead to political instability and are more likely to result in closed regimes, rather than orderly political transitions, and fall outside the scope of inquiry (Harkness, 2018). When a military is more institutionalized its interests become more corporate and it acts to secure these interests with an orderly transition to civilian rule.

I also note that the military’s strategic actions may play out through a lengthy period and is contingent on factors which may vary over time. For example, the military may engage in negotiations with parties over certain parameters of the emerging political system, but alter its behavior as it learns more about parties through its interactions with them, or as it simply gains more information about the parties’ strength and interests by observing the
parties’ behavior during the transition.

**Case Selection and Methods**

To evaluate whether militaries are more likely to bind democratization when confidence in parties is low, I use a mixed-methods research design. A mixed-methods approach is appropriate given constraints on analyzing democratization and military behavior and factors that cannot be manipulated by a researcher. Using observational methods allow me to collect data and analyze the historical record using both qualitative and quantitative tools.

For part of the empirical evaluation I use paired comparative historical analysis to compare historical trajectories and identify causal mechanisms during the regime transition (Thelen and Mahoney, 2015; Slater and Simmons, 2010; Slater and Ziblatt, 2013; Skocpol, 1979; Brady and Collier, 2010; Riedl and Roberts, 2020). To perform comparative historical analysis I conducted extensive field work which included use of national, military, and party archives, paired with semi-structured interviews of elites from the authoritarian regime.

While comparative historical analysis is an appropriate method to identify causal mechanisms, one potential weakness is ensuring that explanatory mechanisms are generalizable. To assess the external validity of the paired comparison, I use quantitative analysis using cross-national data on regime transitions. Using secondary resources on 252 unique regime transitions across four datasets, I code nineteen features of regime transitions to measure whether it is bounded. I combine my original data with data on party institutionalization and strength, along with other factors relevant to democratic transitions. I then use OLS to test the association of bounded democratization with the characteristics of the incumbent party to establish the generalizability of the theoretical claims.

For the comparative historical analysis I select the post-authoritarian cases of Indonesia and Paraguay. I select Indonesia and Paraguay because they meet necessary conditions to test a theory wherein the military’s strategic behavior is influenced by the characteristics of civilian parties. Indonesia and Paraguay are an appropriate comparison because they are similar on several dimensions critical to explain the military’s behavior during democratiza-
tion, yet differ on the key explanatory variable.

Even though Indonesia and Paraguay are different on social, economic, cultural, and geographic factors, they do share important similarities on military characteristics and their authoritarian experience. Both militaries were well-institutionalized and unitary actors that played a major political role for decades prior to democratization. Indonesia and Paraguay experienced over thirty years of military rule where a former army general led the regime, while the military ruled in a coalition with a civilian party. The key difference between the two cases, which allows for a comparison that identifies the causal mechanisms at play, is the variation in the characteristics of the authoritarian incumbent party and the military’s confidence in civilian parties. Should I compare either of these cases to another former military regime which did not feature a political party, it would be difficult to establish that the military’s behavior was related to the absence of a party. Instead, by using these cases I hold the military and regime characteristics constant, and vary the characteristics of the incumbent party to demonstrate how variation in the party’s institutionalization and strength influences the military’s behavior.

While the differences between Indonesian and Paraguayan on social, economic, cultural, and geographic factors may seem to matter, they do not play a significant role in explaining variation in bounded democratization between the two cases. Both countries passed the threshold for procedural democracy following three decades of military-backed authoritarian rule, but democratization in the case of Indonesia was bounded, whereas democratization in Paraguay was unbounded. I emphasize that the conceptual frameworks which are used to explain traditional democratization differ substantively from bounded democratization. I also argue that theoretical frameworks used to explain traditional procedural democratization cannot account for the difference in bounded democratization between the two cases.

I present the explanatory variables of prominent theoretical frameworks of traditional democratization to demonstrate how these explanations fail to explain variation in bounded democratization. If a given explanatory variable aligns in both the Paraguayan and In-
donesian cases, and conforms with expected outcomes, I cannot dismiss that framework as an alternative explanation because it may also explain bounded democratization. If an explanatory variable diverges between Indonesia and Paraguay, I can dismiss that explanation because both cases passed the threshold for procedural democracy, and it is unlikely that that variable could pass by procedural democratization and explain variation in bounded democratization.

Furthermore, if the explanatory variables align between the two cases, but contradict the expected outcome, I can also dismiss that explanation because it failed to explain traditional democratization in the two cases. If a variable is unable to explain traditional democratization in both Indonesia and Paraguay, it is unlikely to be a plausible cause of the variation in bounded democratization between the two cases. I present several theoretical frameworks, their explanatory mechanisms, and outcomes in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Indonesia prediction</th>
<th>Indonesia outcome</th>
<th>Paraguay prediction</th>
<th>Paraguay outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite agency</td>
<td>Insider - outsider pact → Democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>Higher GDP → Democratization + Survival</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td>Modern values → Democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistributivist</td>
<td>Higher inequality → No democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic inclusion</td>
<td>Higher inequality → Democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic culture</td>
<td>Islamic majorities → No democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rentier effect</td>
<td>Resource wealth → No democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 2 I stipulate whether the prediction of a given theory aligns with the observed outcome. For example, Indonesia and Paraguay were relatively poor at the time of democratization. Thus, the two cases converge on the explanatory variable, but contradict the
expected outcome given that economic growth models would expect that poorer countries
to, either not democratize, or not survive long after democratization. Because both cases
democratized while poor, and continue to be democracies, the economic growth thesis is an
unlikely explanation of the variation in bounded democratization between the two cases.

Indonesia and Paraguay also diverge on various mechanisms tied democratization, but
given that both democratized, I dismiss those mechanisms as potential explanations of
bounded democratization. For example, Indonesia had far greater income and land equality
than Paraguay, yet both democratized. If any of these explanations are applied to both
cases, they fail to explain how both cases democratized and should not be used to explain
variation in bounded democratization.

By selecting Indonesia and Paraguay, I hold the factors on which they are similar (i.e.
political characteristics of the military) constant, and demonstrate how the factors where
they diverge (i.e. characteristics of the party-military relationship) explain the variation in
bounded democratization while dismissing alternative theories of democratization as poten-
tial explanations of bounded democratization.

**Antecedent Conditions in Indonesia and Paraguay**

In this section I outline the antecedent conditions which shaped the military’s decision-
making. Specifically, I outline the relationship each military had with political parties, and
how the development of the authoritarian incumbent party shaped the military’s confidence
in democratic rule. I begin with the case of the Indonesian military and Golkar. The
foundation of Indonesia’s military was built under Japanese colonial rule (Indonesia, 1948).
To hold territory in Indonesia, Japan created a military throughout the archipelago known
as *pembela tanah air* or PETA. PETA training was extremely harsh, and created a strong
sense of unity within its officer corps (Lee, 2013). Even though PETA was disbanded after
Japan’s surrender, officers from PETA would go on to make up the revolutionary army’s core
after being organized by independence leader Sukarno. Many of these officers were fervent
nationalists, who supported Indonesia’s nationalist philosophy of *Pancasila* which centers
around the idea of a unified national territory and non-sectarian belief in god.

The military’s nationalist officers were highly distrustful of politicians and officers who did not share their ideals, especially those within Islamist or leftists organizations because they viewed these actors as undermining Panasila. The belief that these actors were undermining Panasila was formed by several leftist and Islamist armed rebellions that were violently countered by the military (of FS Posts Indonesian Djakarata Embassy, 1964a,b). When the military would eventually take power in 1965, it was in response to an attempted coup by communists that killed six out of the seven highest ranking army officers, all of whom had either served in PETA or the revolutionary army.

Prior to the 1965 abortive coup, the military sought to balance the power of leftist and Islamist organizations in the government by creating its own nationalist organization known as Sekber Golkar. Sekber Golkar was an amalgamation of nationalist oriented corporate interests groups. After taking power in 1965, the military initially ruled directly, but its need for a civilian partner grew over time as demands for elections increased. Prior to organizing the first elections since taking power, the military began reforming Sekber Golkar into an organization that could compete in elections on the military’s behalf.

To prepare Sekber Golkar for elections, the military focused its reforms on creating institutionalized leadership committees and a national organization. The military’s efforts paid off as Sekber Golkar, now renamed Golkar, performed well in the first authoritarian elections of 1971. Golkar was further developed in the 1980s under the leadership of retired Lt. General Sudharmono, who recruited and trained millions of party cadres at the local and national level (Manihuruk, 1991).

During the entirety of authoritarian rule in Indonesia, opposition parties were barred from campaigning at the local level, while Golkar was free to do so. Furthermore, the president of Indonesia, retired General Suharto, steered state resources to Golkar. Thus, Golkar developed without ever facing genuine electoral or political difficulty. Golkar’s lack of experience in free and fair elections created significant uncertainty for the military, leaving
the military unsure that Golkar would win power and protect its interests.

That Golkar remained untested was not the only problem for the military when considering democratization. Throughout Indonesia’s history Islamist parties, whose vision of an Islamic oriented state, were electorally strong. Even though these parties were not free to organize during the authoritarian period, the structure of Islamic organizations and potential foundations for Islamist parties remained in place. Furthermore, the opposition party PDI’s historical links with Sukarno’s PNI, which had embraced leftism, remained a major party. That Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, controlled the PDI strengthened the military’s wariness of the party. Together, these factors created uncertainty as to whether Golkar would be strong enough to protect the military’s interests.

The Colorado Party and Military Development in Paraguay

The development of Paraguay’s military and ruling party differ significantly from Golkar and was critical for the military’s confidence in the party. Unlike in Indonesia, the incumbent party developed separately from the military, and the military and party would become close allies after a major civil war. The two largest parties in Paraguay, the Liberal and Colorado parties were founded by oligarchs in attempt to capture control of the government after the disastrous Triple Alliance War (Abente, 1995). At the turn of the 20th century the Liberal Party held power and began a process of institutionalizing the military.

The military’s relationship with the Liberal Party was positive until the Chaco War with Bolivia in the 1930s. Prior to war with Bolivia, the Liberal Party ignored calls from the military to increase the size of military forces to counter the possibility of a Bolivian incursion into the Chaco region. After war broke out, the Liberal government delegated authority to the military to manage the war effort, and the military drastically increased the size of the military (Alvarenga, 2012). The Liberal’s mismanagement of the Chaco issue turned officers against the party. The party’s relationship with the military deteriorated further when the Liberal government agreed to a full scale demobilization as part of its peace settlement, and then refused to pay enlisted soldiers. Problems between the party and military came to a
head when the Liberals exiled outspoken officer Rafael Franco. In reaction to Franco’s exile, sympathetic officers conducted a coup placed Franco into power, but the military would remove Franco from power a year and a half after he took power.

After removing Franco, the military installed war hero José Félix Estigarribia into power. Estigarribia died a short time later, leaving General Higinio Morínigo as president. Morínigo would align with Franco’s Feberistas and the Colorado Party but this alliance only lasted a few years before Morínigo threw his full support to the Colorado Party. In pushing the Feberistas out of the government, Morínigo spurred a civil war between the Colorado aligned faction of the military against the parts of the military allied with all other parties. The result of the civil war was an outright victory for the Colorado Party, which took full control of the government and allied with an officer corps dominated by those loyal to the party.

One reason for the Colorados’ victory was the strength of the party when the civil war broke out. When the party was founded, however, it was an oligarchic party with shallow social roots and a poorly organized national structure. Power was centralized around the party’s founder, Bernardino Caballero, and the lack of institutionalized leadership led the party to splinter after Caballero’s death in 1912. With Caballero’s death and the breakdown of the party, the Colorado Party lacked the strength to challenge the Liberal Party’s hold on power and remained a minor political actor for decades.

The factors which produced the party’s strength to take power in the late 1940s began to develop in the 1920s. Building on the national structure left by Caballero, party activist and son of one of the party’s founders, Juan Manual Frutos, and a group of party cadres spent years developing local party community centers known as seccionales. After years of Frutos’ team of cadres organizational efforts, the party boasted hundreds of seccionales, and smaller sub-seccionales throughout the entire country (Basualdo, 2009).

These seccionales were the lifeblood of the party. Each seccional had a designated territory and administered party business down to the neighborhood level. Seccionales were staffed by cadres who were elected by party members of each local seccional. Yet these
seccionales did more than just party business, they stimulated and intertwined in the social life of everyday Paraguayans and forged strong ties between the party and local society, crystallizing an identity of being a Colorado for vast swaths of the Paraguayan society.

After Morínigo expelled the Feberistas from his cabinet and the military split, the Colorado Party marshalled its own armed forces by using its seccionales to mobilize thousands of pynandi peasant foot-soldiers from throughout the country. The broad territorial organization which was developed by Frutos endowed the party with the capacity to defeat the rebels in concentrated battles around the capital, and then go on to exert political control throughout the entire territory.

While the party used mass-mobilization to win the civil war, the party’s deep roots in society would have been less effective had the party’s elites remained fractured. Decades after Caballero’s death, party elites began to cohere when the Liberal Party moved to ban political parties in an attempt to hold on to power in the wake of the Chaco War.

The attempt to ban parties served as a catalyst to induce cohesion amongst Colorado elites (Patria, 1936a). In early 1936, party elites called for a national convention to discuss party unity. Up to this point, there had been no national conventions, and the party lacked a standing national committee that could handle party business. In addition to signing a unity pact, party elites agreed to form a new national committee (Junta de Gobierno) that would govern and coordinate party business on a regular basis (Patria, 1936b). This new committee was elected by leaders of the various seccionales during a national convention. Members of the Junta de Gobierno then elected an executive committee, comprised of a president, multiple vice-presidents, secretaries, and treasurers. The executive committee coordinated efforts of the broader national committee, and made executive decisions on behalf of the party while coordinating efforts with like-minded officers in the military.

The routinization of national leadership, strong social roots, and close relationship with the military enabled Colorado dominated rule for decades. When long time president Alfredo

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1Pynandi is a Guarani word which can be roughly translated to shoe-less.
Stroessner’s tenure ended in 1989, the party’s strength, institutionalization, and close ties to the officer corps meant that the military was confident that the party could win power and protect its interests under democracy.

**Democratization and Military Uncertainty in Indonesia and Paraguay**

In this section I present evidence of the Indonesian military’s behavior to bind the democratic transition. Prior to the authoritarian regime the party system was fragmented with the communist party (PKI), a fierce opponent of the military and nationalists, demonstrating significant strength. Not only did the PKI threaten the military, but the other largest parties in the system did not share the military’s nationalist orientation. The largest party, Sukarno’s PNI, moved increasingly leftward to the chagrin of the military (Jenkins, 1984), and the two other major parties were Islamist parties that the military distrusted. When the PKI killed several commanding generals, the military took full control of the political system and focused reforms on the party system. After taking power the military would keep control of politics under General Suharto until the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.

In response to the financial crisis and former general Suharto’s inability to promote a coherent response (Pepinsky, 2009), unrest emerged throughout Indonesia with large scale popular mobilization in the capital of Jakarta. Protests strengthened even in response to crackdowns by the police and military and swelled in the early weeks of May 1998, bringing student protesters in direct confrontation with the military. Leading the military at this time was General Wiranto who had been promoted as commander of the armed forces just months before and who was a nationalist (Mietzner, 2009).

The challenge facing the military peaked in mid-May when students stormed the national legislature and occupied its grounds. With students occupying the legislature, the legislative leadership, which included a representative of the military faction within the legislature, met and unanimously supported a resolution calling for Suharto’s resignation (Perry, 1998).

In response to the legislature’s resolution calling for Suharto’s resignation, Wiranto and the military’s upper brass pushed back and called the legislature’s actions illegitimate (Said, 2009).
Thus, at this point in the crisis, Wiranto and other high ranking officers demonstrated a lack of confidence in Golkar’s ability to manage a transition in the military’s interests. Wiranto and the military would hold this line until Suharto himself decided to resign.

On the night prior to Suharto’s resignation, Suharto met with Wiranto and gave him authority to form a military council to control the transition. Wiranto then informed senior officers of Suharto’s plans to resign and the power he delegated to the military, but also his reluctance to use the military to take control. Wiranto worried that protests would continue, and that more students could be killed as a result. Instead, Wiranto directed the military to support a transition of power to the vice president B.J. Habibie. Even though Wiranto was reluctant to take control of the transition, the military could still use its political power and partnership with Golkar to bind the transition without taking full control.

It is clear that the factors of the crisis did not determine the military’s behavior. The military’s behavior was a function of strategic decisions made by high-ranking officers of the military, who were uncertain of the best course of action. After the legislature’s call for Suharto’s resignation the military could have demonstrated its confidence in Golkar and immediately backed the civilian leadership. Instead, Wiranto continued to support Suharto because he was uncertain of how a civilian-led transition would play out.

In the time between the legislature’s call for Suharto’s resignation and his actual resignation, Wiranto and the military could have taken many other actions, including full suppression of the student-led movement. Even with Suharto’s resignation, there was no guarantee that Wiranto would not have used the military’s power to take control of the transition. All of these alternative options were available to the military, yet the military eventually allowed civilians to lead, but not control, the transition.

On the morning of 21 May 1998, Suharto resigned and passed power to Habibie. After becoming president, Habibie set Indonesia on the path of democratization by calling for elections in the following year. While Habibie’s leadership was key for democratization, the transition was still very much steered by the military prior to the first elections. Because
the 1997 elections were held under authoritarian electoral institutions, the legislature was dominated by Golkar and the military. The incumbents’ large majority granted Golkar and the military significant influence over reforms during the early stages of the transition and helped ensure that the institutions favored by the military would not be removed. One major demand of the protesters and opposition parties was political decentralization.

For most of its time since independence, Indonesia was a centralized state with limited regional autonomy. The centralization of the state was viewed within nationalist factions to be critical to uphold the national philosophy of *Pancasila*. At the time of Suharto’s resignation, sub-national legislative and executive offices where dominated by Golkar and retired officers. Full decentralization would weaken the nationalist’s hold on regional political offices, and the military feared this would potentially fan the flames of regional tension.

To preempt decentralization on the opposition’s terms, Golkar and the military used their power in the interim period to pass decentralization on their terms. Instead of extensive decentralization, Golkar and the military allowed moderate autonomy at the sub-national level, including direct elections for mayors, governors, and local legislatures, but significant power over taxation and security remained with the central state. During debate over these reforms, the military openly stated its opposition to extensive decentralization, and warned that any decentralization could endanger national unity (Jenderal, 1999).

Following the 1999 election, the military’s presence in the legislature was reduced to only 40 seats in the legislature. While the military could no longer unilaterally influence policy it could check more ambitious reforms (Ziegenhain, 2008) with help from allies. Thus, the military bound democratization by maintaining a formal presence in the legislature. With its formal representation, the military was also given a deputy speaker position in the upper house – allowing the military to be directly involved in bargaining at the leadership level over policy, reforms, and other actions taken in the legislature.

Another way the military bound the transition was by constraining executive power. Instead of allowing direct presidential elections, Habibie, Golkar, and the military kept the
president indirectly elected. Keeping the president indirectly elected meant the military voted on who could become president. After the 1999 election, and failed attempts by two Golkar candidates to win the presidency, the military threw its support to Abdurrahman Wahid, better known as Gus Dur.

As president, Gus Dur was frequently checked by the military. In addition to the military’s continued presence in the legislature, several recently retired officers joined Gus Dur’s cabinet and controlled key roles in security affairs. These officers rebuffed Gus Dur’s attempts to reform the military and use it for political support.

The retired officers’ control of the security portfolio was key for the military’s continued support of democratization. With their close ties to the officer corps, retired officers held a high degree of trust of the military and were able to advocate for the military’s mission within the executive. The retired officers’ control of the security portfolio guaranteed that Gus Dur could not stray too far from the military’s preferences. Indeed, when Gus Dur tried to do so, the military pushed back and supported the move to impeach and remove him.

With events in Indonesia spiraling out of control, Gus Dur tried to dig in and hold on to power. Refusing calls from members of his own cabinet to resign, Gus Dur ordered the Minister for Politics and Security, retired Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to implement a state of emergency. Yudhoyono refused to follow this order and resigned. Days later, the military mobilized as a show of force against Gus Dur and protected the special legislative session organized to impeach and remove him. On 23 July 2000 the impeachment resolution was adopted without a single vote in dissent, including votes in favor of impeachment by the military faction. After Gus Dur was removed, and Megawati sworn in as the new president, the military returned to the barracks and the turbulent transition to democracy continued.

Gus Dur’s impeachment provides a clear example of the military binding the democratic transition. In response to an executive who acted against the military’s interests, the military mobilized in opposition and used institutions to remove him from power. In its bid to remove
him from power, the military employed its coercive capacity and only demobilized after a more nationalist oriented politician became president.

As president, Megawati did little to antagonize the military and other elites. Megawati would serve out the rest of the presidential mandate which expired in 2004, but would run for reelection. Prior to 2004 the rules were changed to allow for direct presidential elections. Yet in her bid for the presidency in 2004, Megawati faced two prominent retired generals; Wiranto and Yudhoyono.

During the transition, Wiranto joined Golkar and captured the party’s nomination for the 2004 presidential election and retired general Yudhoyono formed the Democrat Party a year after he resigned from Gus Dur’s cabinet. Thus, the 2004 election featured two nationalist retired generals against Megawati. Wiranto finished a close third behind Megawati in the first round, leaving Megawati and Yudhoyono to contest the second round. With a prominent Golkar businessman as his vice presidential running-mate, Yudhoyono easily defeated Megawati in the second round. At the same time Golkar would go on to regain its position as the largest party.

With the 2004 election Indonesia saw a former prominent nationalist general elected to the presidency, and the military’s old political ally, Golkar, regain its position as the largest party in the legislature. With nationalists in power, civilians had demonstrated their ability to secure power – with the help of several retired officers – and protect the military’s interests. With former officers and allies in power, the military fully resigned its formal political powers in the legislature and finished its protracted return to the barracks. Having successfully bound the transition, the military was confident that the transition to a democratic system no longer endangered the military’s interests.

**The Fall of Stroessner and Party-led Democratization**

The military’s behavior during Paraguay’s democratic transition differed significantly than Indonesia’s. Where the Indonesian military was active throughout the transition, the Paraguayan military stepped away and completely deferred to civilians.
The crisis which produced the downfall of authoritarian rule in Paraguay is linked to Alfredo Stroessner betraying the trust of both the party and military. For most of his thirty-four year rule, Stroessner did little to upset either the party or military. As the old guard of the party began to retire, Stroessner became more active in the party and worked to elevate loyalists. By throwing his support behind loyalists, Stroessner helped create two factions within the party; the *militantes* who were militant in their support of Stroessner, and the *tradicionalistas* [Abente-Brun 2009]. The *militantes* slowly gained power in the 1980s and eventually captured the party, by literally locking the *tradicionalistas* out of a party congress used to select party leadership. In the middle of the night prior to the party congress, the *militantes* entered the grounds and locked the gates and used their connections within the Ministry of the Interior to deploy the police to protect the grounds.

With the *tradicionalistas* barred from the party congress, the *militantes* captured the entirety of the party’s leadership in both the *Junta de Gobierno* and executive committee. With total control of the party the *militantes* renominated Stroessner to the presidency, and he would go on to win the 1988 election. In addition to renominating Stroessner, the *militantes* developed a plan to clear a path of promotions in the military for Stroessner’s son Gustavo, who was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force.

Gustavo Stroessner had little path to rise to the rank of general like his father for two reasons. First, there were several officers in front of Gustavo and, with few retirements, there simply were not enough positions to provide promotions. Second, Gustavo was not widely liked in the military, which was dominated by the Paraguayan Army. As an officer in the Air Force, Gustavo had weak ties to those who had served in combat in the military and was seen as benefiting from nepotism. To open the way for Gustavo to rise through the ranks, Stroessner and the *militantes* planned to force the retirements of officers who blocked Gustavo. A majority of officers at the time saw the party’s attempt to force retirements as a violation of the previous institutional autonomy they had enjoyed when the *tradicionalistas* controlled the party [Riquelme 1992].
With the trust between the military and party eroding, the military turned to the *tradicionalistas* for help. Even though the *tradicionalistas* had been locked out of the party, the military trusted them because they had fought together in the 1947 civil war, and then ruled side-by-side for several decades. Outside of power, the *tradicionalistas* had little sway within the party committees, but their experience and links to the *seccionales* throughout the country meant they had a credible base of power should they regain control of the party’s leadership committees. It was within this context that officers reached out to some of the party’s old guard to develop a plan to oust Stroessner and his *militantes*.

The conspiracy to oust Stroessner was led by two prominent members of the Colorado Party. First was Edgar Ynsfrán, who had served as the Minister of the Interior for years under Stroessner. Second was Luis María Argaña. Argaña had served as the President of the Supreme Court for several years before being ousted after the *militantes* took over the party. Together, these two prominent Colorados worked with General Andrés Rodríguez, who was the commander of the Army’s First Division. As head of the First Division, Rodríguez commanded the army’s largest and best equipped armored and infantry units, in addition to his strong ties to other commanders throughout the army (Yegros 1988).

As part of the plan for the coup, the three elites agreed that the party would make Rodríguez president should he remove Stroessner and return the party to the *tradicionalistas*. When Stroessner moved to force Rodríguez’s retirement in February 1989, Rodríguez launched the coup (Lezcano and Martini 1994).

After removing Stroessner from power, Rodríguez helped the *tradicionalistas* recapture the party. Back in power, the old guard immediately forced out the *militantes* and established an interim *Junta de Gobierno* and executive committee comprised of retired *tradicionalistas*. The behavior of the military in returning power to the party demonstrates that the coup was about reestablishing the trust between the party and military, which had existed prior the rise of the *militantes*. With the *tradicionalistas* back in power, the military could be confident that its institutional interests would be secure.
Soon after the coup, the party installed Rodríguez as president, and multiparty elections were held in which opposition parties were given greater freedom. Even with greater freedom for the opposition parties, the Colorados won significant majorities and demonstrated their strength by maintaining control of the presidency and both houses of congress. Despite the Colorados’ electoral win, there were many in the party that worried that they were repeating the same mistake they had made with Stroessner.

Wary of keeping a general in power, the party could initiate democratization via a provision in the constitution which granted power to revise the constitution, in part or totality, to the National Assembly. Should the National Assembly call for revisions to the constitution, a constitutional assembly would be formed which included both houses of the National Assembly and the Council of State. The Council of State was comprised of the executive cabinet, the chiefs of each arm of the military, the archbishop of Asunción, and other leaders of labor, agricultural, and education sectors.

Having determined to pursue democracy and prevent another Stroessner, party leadership determined that the President of the Senate, Waldino Ramón Lovera, would call for the constitutional assembly. Catching word of their intentions, President Rodríguez undercut the party and announced the call for the constitutional assembly himself.

With the call for a new constitution, Paraguay held an election to select a constitutional assembly. The Colorado Party dominated this election, winning 122 of the 198 elected seats. With a large majority in the constitutional assembly, the Colorado Party was positioned to design the subsequent democratic system largely on its own terms. A potential challenge for the party was the presence of the military in the assembly due to its place in the Council of State. Despite its formal prerogative, the military deferred to civilian leadership throughout the process of designing the new constitution, even on matters of military reforms.

According to interviews with civilians who participated in drafting the constitution, the trust between the military and the Colorado Party was key for the military to not interfere with democratization. Trust between the Colorado Party and the military was high for
several reasons. The relationship between the officers and the party was strong due to a shared vision of the national project, with a close alignment between the two actors due to their alliance during the civil war and conservative ideology. In addition to a shared ideology, the party’s old guard demonstrated its willingness to act on behalf of the military by providing political support in removing Stroessner and the militantes, who had threatened the institutional interests of the military.

Another key to the military’s confidence in the Colorado Party was the party’s political strength. In addition to holding the military’s trust, the party had demonstrated its political power and ability to secure the military’s interests under democratic rules. By gaining over 60% of the seats in two elections after the coup, the party had sent a clear signal to the military that the party would remain in power after democratization.

The case of Paraguay demonstrates the need to understand party-military relations to explain the strategic behavior of the military during democratization. Like Indonesia, democratization in Paraguay was led by incumbents who did not form any pact with the opposition. Not only did the incumbents not form a pact with the opposition, but democratization occurred in Paraguay with muted popular demands for democracy. Furthermore, Paraguay democratized even though land and income inequality was high. To understand how Paraguay democratized we must account for the military’s confidence in the Colorado Party. Because the Colorado Party held the military’s trust, and was a stable and strong party, the military could allow civilians to drive democratization without fearing the prospects of civilian rule.

The cases of Indonesia and Paraguay highlight the importance of the institutionalization and electoral and/or political strength of the incumbent party. In Indonesia, the development of Golkar under military rule produced a party that was untested. Even though the military trusted Golkar’s leadership, it could not be confident that Golkar could survive the transition and defend the military’s interests in a democratic system. Unlike Golkar, the Colorado Party had demonstrated its strength in the civil war and in elections before full democratization in 1993. The Colorado’s strength, combined with the military’s trust, produced a high degree
of confidence that the military could return to the barracks without danger to its interests. This dynamic can be seen in Table 3. Had either military lacked a trusted party, or had the parties been weakly institutionalized, as is often the case following military rule, the military would have had to act more unilaterally to secure its interests during democratization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Party-Military Relations and Bounded Democratization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paraguay</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Incumbent Party - Military Relationship</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Project</td>
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<td><strong>Incumbent Party Institutionalization</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cohesion</td>
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<td>Routinization</td>
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<td>Autonomy</td>
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<td>Territorial Breadth</td>
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<td>Social linkages</td>
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<td><strong>Incumbent Party Strength</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Control of Legislature</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control of Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral Strength</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bounded Democratization</strong></td>
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**Militaries and Bounded Democratization in a Global Perspective**

Using a qualitative comparison between Indonesia and Paraguay I have outlined the causal pathway which affects the formation of bounded systems. I now evaluate the theory using a global sample of regime transitions following military rule to assess the generalizability of this theory. To test whether bounded democratization is related to the military’s confidence, I use an original dataset which codes the behavior of militaries during regime transitions. With this data I use OLS models to build on the qualitative comparative historical analysis, and demonstrate that the evidence of my theory is generalizable beyond the cases of Indonesia and Paraguay. I begin by introducing the the original dataset which is used later for analysis.

Much of the quantitative analysis on democratization is linked to the modernization
or *distributional consequences* hypothesis (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014). Despite the strengths of these works, one shortcoming is the generalizability of these theories. As Haggard and Kaufman (2018) point out, several instances of democratization are elite or incumbent driven, even when there may be distributional or modernization factors present.

I bring attention to this literature to demonstrate how conceptualizations and explanations of regime transitions would benefit from narrowing the scope of inquiry. I argue that the traditional approach in the democratization literature overlooks certain strategies pursued by incumbents, such as the military, during transitions which has then prevented the field from developing situationally appropriate concepts.

By including cases of military-led democratization in analysis, the literature includes cases where the distribution of economic goods was not a concern to the military, nor was development a factor in driving the military towards liberalizing. Instead, the military’s prerogatives and its interests were primary factors at play during these transitions (Stepan 1988; O’Donnell et al. 1986). I address this issue by narrowing the scope of analysis solely to cases of military-led democratization, where the primary concern of the military should be securing its corporate interests. By restricting the scope to military-led transitions, I provide a more precise understanding of the dynamics affecting democratic development when emerging from military rule, rather than making broader claims about democratization.

Another area where I build on the traditional approach is the conceptualization and operationalization of democratization away from either the *quality* or *robustness* of democratic institutions, procedures, and liberalism. Widely used measures of democracy range from measuring strict procedural terms of democracy, to a more normative approach that accounts for inclusivity and rights (Coppedge et al. 2011). The variation in conceptualizations has thus produced minimalist measures of democracy, where a simple procedural threshold must be met (Przeworski et al. 2000), to continuous measures which try to capture various dimensions of democratic quality (Marshall et al. 2002; Coppedge et al. 2020; House 2014).
While conceptualizing democracy around its quality or robustness is certainly appropriate in most circumstances, doing so results in measures which fail to capture certain features of military-led democratization. Current measures of democracy do not account for how the military shapes the emerging system. Because the military may design institutions that are more competitive than what was found in the previous regime, both binary and continuous measures of democracy would capture a discrete shift towards democracy. In turn, these measures fail to account for how the system may be biased in favor of the military’s allies or capture institutional constraints on democratic competition, because these constraints do not violate certain thresholds of democracy measured by traditional indicators.

For example, under coding schemes such as Polity IV or Varieties of Democratization, Chile was considered highly democratic after Pinochet stepped down, even though he and the military bound democracy by ensuring the over-representation of conservatives. Pinochet and the military designed an open system, with free and fair elections and instituted liberal rights. How they bound the system, however, ensured that electoral procedures would not produce a government dominated by leftists, which the military feared. It was not until 2020-2021 that Chileans were able to fully dismantle the military-era constitution. Because previously developed concepts and measures of democracy are ill-suited to account for how the military can set parameters on democracy, even when the emerging system is democratic, I developed the concept of bounded democratization with a corresponding measure. Thus, a key contribution I make to the literature on democratization is to provide a more nuanced measure of democracy, which captures political liberalization, but also measures the restrictions that the military sets on the emerging democratic system.

Classifying Military Regimes

To determine whether bounded democratization is a function of the military’s confidence in parties, I construct a global sample of military regimes drawn from the post-WWII period. There is debate as to what constitutes a military regime. For some, a regime does not qualify as military rule unless the military controls access to political office or policy as a corporate
entity (Geddes et al., 2014). Under this more conservative conceptualization of military rule, the officer corps must act cohesively to control politics without delegating too much power to the regime leader. Any regime where the leader emerged from the officer corps, but who garners significant power to control access to political office, is no longer considered a military regime, but instead a personalist regime. Others offer an inclusive conceptualization of military rule, where a regime is considered as military rule had the regime leader ever been a career officer (Cheibub et al., 2010). Still, others take a position of military rule in the middle, considering the difference between corporate military rule, personalist military rule, or indirect military rule, or requiring that the regime leader have been an officer immediately prior to taking power (Svolik, 2012; Wahman et al., 2013).

I do not arbitrate amongst these various approaches or formulate my own conceptualization of military rule. To ensure that my findings do not depend on any single conceptualization of military rule, I use different samples of military regimes. I not only use the various datasets to test the robustness of the results, but also to exploit the differences between conceptualizations of military rule to demonstrate that the military’s behavior is dependent upon the characteristics of political parties.

When a dataset only considers a regime to be military rule when the corporate military rules, bounded democratization should decrease when the institutionalization and strength of the incumbent party increases. Alternatively, when datasets qualify a regime as military rule even when the institutional military is not politically active, I should find no correlation between the military’s confidence and bounded democracy. If true, the null results provide evidence that it is the military as an institution, rather than officers with a military background, which acts to protect its interests during a transition.

To construct the samples of military regimes I use four datasets which code authoritarian regimes. The first dataset is (Geddes et al., 2014) (Hereafter GWF). GWF uses a conservative conceptualization of military rule, where the military must act as a corporate entity to control political office or policy. Thus, it is best suited to test my theory, which centers around a
military acting to secure its corporate interests. While GWF is more conservative, there are considerable benefits to using GWF. One benefit of GWF is that the authors code for hybrid regimes, where the military rules alongside either/or a personalist ruler and/or a party. Thus, GWF does not limit regimes to be either military or civilian, but captures civilian-military coalitions.

I also use Cheibub et al. (2010) (Hereafter DD). DD conceptualizes military rule more inclusively, with a regime considered to be military rule had the regime leader ever worn a military uniform. The presence of observations where the military may have not played a substantive political role should attenuate estimates because civilian incumbents already control politics independent of the strength or degree of institutionalization of the ruling party. Should I find no significant correlation between the characteristics of incumbent parties and bounded democratization using this data, I will conclude that the framework of bounded democratization is appropriate to explain political development where the military, as an institution, ruled.

I also use the dataset developed by Svolik (2012) (Hereafter PAR). PAR differs from others because it codes components (e.g. ruling party, military, etc) of an authoritarian regime independently. Should the military feature a military component, PAR accounts for whether it was personalist, corporate, or indirect. PAR is more conservative in what it qualifies as a military leader than DD. For PAR, the military is considered to be part of the regime if the head of the regime is a professional soldier who was active directly prior to them coming to power. PAR also accounts for regime transitions even should the regime leader remain in power, or if the military remains in control, by coding nominal shifts in the power of the executive. Thus, PAR captures regime transitions from corporate military rule to where an officer captures significant personal power and marginalizes the military.

The last dataset I use is Wahman et al. (2013) (Hereafter WTH). WTH centers its conceptualization of regime types around the party system. Thus, WTH codes a regime depending on the degree to which the party system is constrained. WTH codes a regime as
military when the military exercises power either directly or indirectly. One way that WTH addresses the issue of a regime leader with a military background is by determining whether the regime leader was selected via civilian institutions or the military.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dataset</th>
<th>Total Military Rule</th>
<th>Average Duration</th>
<th>Competitive Transitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GWF</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>10.19</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>12.36</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTH</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I note that the observed sample of military regimes which become more competitive is non-random and caution should be taken in interpreting the results from quantitative analysis using these samples. As can be seen in Table 4, the proportion of military regimes which transition to more competitive regimes ranges from 46% to 58%. That only about half of all military regimes become competitive suggests that there are factors which affect whether these transitions result in more competitive regimes.

In circumstances of military-led transitions, there may be an alternative logic for the military and whether it allows a transition to a more competitive regime. I have outlined three factors that affect the military’s behavior – given the military’s decision to support a transition to a competitive regime. Whether the military tolerates the idea of competitive elections is significant as it denotes a shift away from military rule. There may be endogenous factors which explain the military’s support for a transition. While this may be the case, the theory provided herein helps explain the military’s behavior once the decision to move to a competitive system has been made. The South Korean military resisted pressure to democratize for much of the 1980s, only to relent in 1987. In addition to pressure from civil-society, factionalism within the retired and active officer corps created the conditions which moved the military away from its position to uphold the status-quo (Sung-Joo, 1988).

It may also be the case that the military does not support the idea of a transition to a competitive regime, even when it is confident in its partisan allies. There are numerous instances of single-party regimes which emerged or fused with military rule in which a junta
gave way to either single-party or personalist rule. For example, Burundi cycled through various dictators who came to power via coups, despite the central role of the UPRONA party in sustaining authoritarian rule.

Because there are other factors which influence whether a military supports a transition away from closed authoritarian rule, the findings president herein should be interpreted with the caveat that the specified theoretical mechanisms matter for bounded democratization, given that the military has made the decision to allow political liberalization.

**Operationalizing and Measuring Bounded Democracy**

To measure bounded democratization, I identify four dimensions of politics that a military may influence during transitions. These four groups correspond to key democratic political institutions and actors; the executive, legislature, elections, and transitional bodies. Within each component I use binary variables which code for the military’s behavior with regards to these dimensions. To code bounded democratization, I identify each regime transition as coded by one of the four datasets outlined above and use the historical record to score each sub-component. A list of all binary variables can be found in Table 5.

Using the nineteen sub-components, I create a measure of bounded democratization by using Item Response Theory (IRT analysis) or Latent Trait Theory. IRT analysis has been used elsewhere in comparative democracy and authoritarianism to measure latent variables, such as personalism. Geddes et al. (2018) The measure, Bounded Democracy, is constructed using the set of nineteen sub-components by each of the four datasets individually. Thus, there is a measure, Bounded Democracy, for GWF, PAR, DD, and WTH. In each instance, Bounded Democracy varies from zero to one, with a median ranging between 0.51 to 0.59 depending on the dataset used, and are reported in Table 6. For each dataset the Cronbach’s α was high, signifying a high degree of inter-correlation between the nineteen items, suggesting that they share the same dimensionality. I also performed a face-validity check to ensure that scores of Bounded Democracy vary according to my prior expectations.

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A discussion on the conceptualization of regime transitions is provided in the appendix.

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Table 5: Component Variables of Bounded Democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Binary Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Executive | Did military design executive institutions?  
                        Did uniformed or recently retired officers sit in cabinet?  
                        Did military create unelected executive institutions?  
                        Did military appoint a civilian executive? |
| Legislature | Did military design legislative institutions?  
                        Did military design institutions to favor civilian allies?  
                        Did military hold seats in the legislature during the transition?  
                        Did military create unelected legislative institutions? |
| Elections | Did military bar significant parties/candidates from contesting elections?  
                        Did officers actively influence campaigns?  
                        Did military bargain over which candidates/parties could participate?  
                        Did military intervene to corrupt or annul election results?  
                        Did active or retired officers run for executive office?  
                        Did military restrict electoral franchise?  
                        Did military kill or imprison candidates?  
                        Did military design electoral institutions? |
| Transition | Did military exercise power within formal transitional institutions?  
                        Did military appoint officers or civilians to transitional institutions?  
                        Did military hold power during transitional elections? |

For example, the measure codes for the transition in Paraguay in 1993 to be low on *Bounded Democracy*. This is appropriate considering the military played a very minor role in the democratic transition. This approach also scores the Thai 2007 transition as the highest level of *Bounded Democracy* which is appropriate given that the military appointed the senate while banning prominent politicians. Other cases, such as Indonesia’s 1999-2004 or Brazil’s transition in the mid-1980s fall in the mid-range of the index.

**Operationalizing Military Confidence**

To measure the military’s confidence, I select incumbent parties and then create variables that measure the degree of party institutionalization and strength of those parties prior to a transition. I select the incumbent party for two reasons. First, there is no direct quantitative measure of trust between a military and political parties available. Thus, I select incumbent parties because these are the parties most trusted by militaries and their presence functions as a proxy of trust. These parties may form independently and share power with the military or may be a direct creation of the military (e.g. Golkar in Indonesia, USDP in Myanmar, or
Table 6: Components of Bounded Democracy and Cronbach’s α

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>GWF</th>
<th>PAR</th>
<th>DD</th>
<th>WTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Items</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive1</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive2</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive3</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive4</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature1</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature2</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature3</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature4</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election1</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election2</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election3</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election4</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election5</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election6</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election7</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election8</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitionary1</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitionary2</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitionary3</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the NDC in Ghana). Given that militaries either share power or defer to these parties during authoritarian rule, we can assume a sufficiently high degree of trust between the two. In instances when the military does not share power with a party, but allows parties to remain organized, we can assume that the military, at the very least, tolerates these parties and is confident that they will not undermine the military’s interests.

To measure party institutionalization I identify the incumbent party and use data developed by the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) on institutional features of individual parties from the V-Party sub-project. V-Party codes several dimensions pertinent to party politics. V-Party collects data by surveying country experts who are asked to code several factors relevant to parties. Each indicator is derived from a measurement model that maps coders’ scores into a continuous latent variable using a Bayesian IRT model (Pemstein et al., 2018).
For the institutionalization index, I select three components from V-Party’s battery of questions on individual parties. I include measures on the degree to which the party maintains permanent local offices (stability), control over candidate nomination (autonomy), and linkages to prominent social organizations (national level mobilization).

An issue with this approach is that a portion of military regimes do not feature a ruling or support party. Should there be no incumbent party, I measure the average party institutionalization of the parties in the system at the time of the transition by using data developed by Bizzarro et al. (2017). Like the measure of party institutionalization which I developed for this analysis, Bizzarro et al. (2017) used V-Dem data to develop a measure of party institutionalization. The key difference is that their data measures party institutionalization at the party system level, rather than the individual party level.

While less ideal than having a measure of individual parties that may be formally or informally be allied with the military, this strategy rests on the plausible assumption that the military tolerates existing parties. Should the military fear specific parties, it would likely ban them, which is quite common under military rule. Thus, any parties the military does not tolerate are excluded from the party system, and their strength and institutionalization will not be measured.

In addition to measuring party institutionalization, I also account for the political and electoral strength of the incumbent party as a proxy for the military’s confidence. I measure the strength of the party, again with V-Party data and Factor Analysis, using the percentage of vote captured in the most recent election, the percentage of seats held in the legislature after the most recent election, and the degree to which a single party controls sub-national office. With these components I measure the extent to which an incumbent party garners large shares of votes, captures seats, and controls sub-national office. As a party’s strength increases, the military’s need to interfere in politics should decrease as it can rely on a strong party it trusts to act on its behalf.
Control Variables

Because I use an observational approach I address potential confounding bias in the models. I attempt to reduce confounding bias by controlling for factors that may produce party institutionalization or strength but also be correlated with bounded democratization. Among these, I include controls for income and land inequality. Land and income inequality may produce the structural conditions for party building which could plausibly act as a backdoor path to bound democratization. I measure income inequality using Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007) which was one of the primary measures of inequality used in Ansell and Samuels (2014). Ansell and Samuels also devised a measure of land inequality by adjusting for the number of family farms by the degree of urbanization. From Ansell and Samuels I also draw data on whether the country had a Muslim majority.

Because I am focused on democratization following military rule, I also control for the coercive capacity of the military which may be used to subvert democratization. Using the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data (Singer et al., 1972, V5.0), I construct a measure of military capacity with data on military expenditures. This data is taken from the CoW NMC dataset and then standardized to the 2000 U.S. dollar, divided by the total population, and then logged. I use the lag of military expenditures to account for the military’s coercive capacity prior to the transition. From this same dataset I also control for the level of urbanization, which could plausibly produce conditions for mass mobilization and party building (Wallace, 2013). Lastly I use data from V-Dem to control for the GDP per capita (logged), as development may also result in the conditions of mass mobilization and the development of party politics. From this same dataset, I control for the level of education, as modernization could also plausible affect the development of parties. Again, using this same data, I also control for oil and resource wealth, as greater wealth could enable greater coercive capacity for the incumbents to restrict the path of democratization. Lastly, I control for the political region because there could be spillover affects, as militaries learn from, and behave similarly to their neighbors.
Results

To model how the military’s confidence affects regime transitions, I use *Bounded Democracy* as the dependent variable and examine all regimes that have a military component and which transitioned to a more competitive system. I then create a cross-section of data for the year of a regime transition. Because *Bounded Democracy* is a continuous variable ranging from 0-1, I use OLS with robust standard errors to estimate the correlation between a military’s confidence and the degree of *Bounded Democracy*.

I begin by using a sample drawn from GWF. With GWF, there should be a negative correlation between an increase in the military’s confidence and bounded democratization. A negative correlation between *Bounded Democracy* and the explanatory variables is affirmative evidence that the military acts as an institution to protect its interests during a regime transition.

I first model the relationship between *Bounded Democracy* and *Institutionalization* of the incumbent party – assuming that the military trusts the incumbent party. I use three models to measure the relationship between *Institutionalization* and *Bounded Democracy*. The first model is a bivariate regression while in the second model, *Base*, I include the control variables outlined above. In the third model, *Inequality*, I include these same control variables, but also include income and land inequality, and present the results of three models in Figure 2. I exclude land and income inequality in the first models, because by including these two variables I lose some observations from the early post-WWII era where there is no data to measure land or income inequality.

These models show that there is a negative relationships between *Institutionalization* and *Bounded Democracy*. As the institutionalization of the incumbent party increases, the degree that the military binds democracy decreases. This finding is statistically significant, using robust standard errors at the 95% level, for the *Base* model, and directionally consistent for the *Bivariate* and *Inequality* models. I find no statistical correlation between any control variables and outcome variable.
While party institutionalization of trusted parties is essential for the military’s confidence, it is only one component of confidence. Thus, I also model the relationship between Bounded Democracy and the Strength of the incumbent party and present the results in Figure 3. As with Institutionalization, I structure the models into three separate models.

The findings presented in Figure 3 affirm what was established with Institutionalization. As Strength increases, Bounded Democracy decreases. Unlike in the Institutionalization models, the results are statistically significant for both the Base and Inequality models. Again, there is no correlation between the control variables and Bounded Democracy.

Because OLS coefficients represent a variance-weighted estimate for the entire sample (Aronow and Samii 2016), I also demonstrate that the negative relationship between the military’s confidence and Bounded Democracy holds for the range of the values of the explanatory variables. To do so, I plot the predicted values of Bounded Democracy by Institutionalization and Strength of the incumbent party. These plots for GWF and all other datasets can be found in the appendix. By plotting the predicted values I find that the trend
line shows a clear negative relationship between Institutionalization and Bounded Democracy for the entire range of values of Institutionalization and Strength.

Using predicted values I also interpret the substantive changes in bounded democratization based on changes in party institutionalization or strength. When considering values of Institutionalization in the lower quartile, a range from 0-0.43, the expected degree of Bounded Democracy is near 0.77. In real world terms, this is like the 1988 Pakistan transition where the military set conditions on civilian rule, stacked the senate, backed certain candidates in elections, and where the incoming Prime Minister had to accept specific conditions in order to come to power (Shiekh 2010; Hoffman, 2011; Wilkinson, 2000). When Institutionalization shifts to the third quartile, or a range between 0.54-0.77, there is less binding, such as the South Korean 1987 transition where the new constitution was drafted by civilians and approved by referendum, but where retired General Roh Tae-woo won the presidential election along with a substantial presence of retired military in the cabinet and National Assembly (Croissant 2004; Kim 2013; Sung-Joo 1988).
The story is similar when looking at *Strength*. When *Strength* is in the lowest quartile, ranging from 0-0.43, the result is a system like the Thai 2007 transition where the military designed the new system, including a substantial portion of unelected seats, and banned Thaksin Shinawatra and his party (Hicken and Kasuya 2003). When *Strength* is in the third quartile, there is less binding, such as in the Uruguayan 1984 transition where the military negotiated a pact regarding military prerogatives, but did little institutional engineering (Agüero 1998).

To test the robustness of these findings I replicate the same analysis with different samples. I begin by using the same models, but using the PAR dataset. Using the same models as with GWF, I plot the results for both *Institutionalization* and *Strength* in Figure 4. The results using PAR provide some support for what I found using GWF.

**Figure 4: Bounded Democracy and Military Confidence – PAR**

Using *Institutionalization* as an explanatory variable, I find a negative relationship between *Institutionalization* and *Bounded Democracy* that is statistically significant. When using *Strength* as a proxy for the military’s confidence, I find a statistically significant relationship between *Strength* and *Bounded Democracy* in the *Bivariate* model. Although the estimate is not statistically significant in the other models, it is directionally consistent with expected outcomes and with what was found using the GWF. PAR also allows the
researcher to distinguish between indirect, personal, and corporate military rule – allowing a more direct test of the proposition that bounded democratization is more likely to occur when the institutional military rules. When selecting solely on corporate military rule, the coefficients are larger in support of the hypothesis that increases in Institutionalization and Strength result in a decrease of Bounded Democracy. Alternatively, when selecting solely cases of personal rule I find null results which is consistent with the theoretical expectations.

As another robustness check I replicate the same models as GWF and PAR, but use WTH to construct the sample of military rule. As with the GWF and PAR, I use three models to estimate the relationship of Bounded Democracy and the military’s confidence and I present the results in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Bounded Democracy and Military Confidence – WTH

Using WTH as an alternative sample of military-led regime transitions produces moderate support of the hypothesis that as the military’s confidence increases, bounded democratization decreases. As can be seen in Figure 5, the coefficients for Institutionalization are significant in the Bivariate models, and directionally consistent with the hypothesis and is close to the 95% confidence threshold for the base model. When proxying military confidence using Strength the coefficients are directionally consistent, with the coefficient in the Bivariate model statistically significant. Because the coefficients are directionally consistent using
GWF, PAR, and WTH, there is sufficient evidence to infer that as the military’s confidence increases, bounded democratization decreases.

I conduct a final robustness check using DD. Given that DD is more permissive with its definition of military rule, there should be weak or no relationship between bounded democracy and the measures of a military’s confidence. DD codes a regime as having a military component solely if the regime leader had, at any time, been an officer. Thus, former officers that rose to power solely through civilian mechanisms are still considered to be a military regime. For example, DD codes the Albanian regime under Enver Hoxha as military rule. Hoxha led the Party of Labor of Albania in addition to being the highest ranking officer in the National Liberation Army. After taking power in Albania, Hoxha and the Party of Labor would rule using party mechanisms, although Hoxha remained the commander-in-chief of the military [Fevziu (2016)].

In Figure 6 we can see that there is not a statistical difference between Institutionalization or Strength and zero. Specifically, the coefficients are effectively zero for the Inequality models. For the Bivariate and Base models, there is a very small negative coefficient, but the confidence intervals are sufficiently large that we cannot even claim them to be directionally consistent as done with the other samples.

Figure 6: Bounded Democracy and Military Confidence – DD
While using DD does not identify a negative relationship between the military’s confidence and bounded democracy, the null results are meaningful. When considered in the context of the other samples, the results using DD help reinforce the findings from GWF and PAR that bounded democracy is more likely to occur when the corporate military rules. When authoritarian rule is characterized by a strong personal leader who has a military background, on the other hand, we do not see the military bind democratization.

Conclusion

Distrust between the military and political parties is a common feature of military rule. When militaries rule, they frequently bar or weaken parties that threaten their corporate interests. After taking power, military faces a considerable dilemma; returning to barracks and allowing democratization necessarily means that parties will return to power. I theorized that militaries are more supportive of a transition to democratic rule when they are confident that political parties will not violate their corporate interests.

I have argued that the military’s confidence is a function of trust, incumbent party institutionalization, and incumbent party strength. As each of these factors increase, the military can be more confident that political parties will not violate its interests, and becomes more supportive of democratization. I provide evidence for this theory using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. Using a paired comparison of Paraguay and Indonesia, I demonstrated that the Indonesian military used its political power to constrain opposition parties during the transition because it was not fully confident in Golkar’s capacity to manage the transition alone. Unlike the Indonesian military, the Paraguayan military quickly returned to the barracks and did not interfere in the development of democratic institutions because it was confident in the Colorado Party’s capacity to act independently.

I coupled the qualitative comparison with quantitative analysis to demonstrate that the theory is generalizable. Using original data, I demonstrated that bounded democratization decreases as the factors of the military’s confidence, incumbent party institutionalization and strength, increase. By showing that the military refrains from imposing parameters on
democracy when party institutionalization and strength is high, I have demonstrated that the strategic interaction between militaries and parties helps explain why democratization following military rule is difficult. When militaries lack confidence in civilian partners, they become more likely to constrain popular sovereignty and contestation.

Recently, some militaries have shown reluctance to cede to demands for democracy. Following its 2014 coup, the Thai military resisted calls for democratization, and instead engineered institutions because there is no conservative pro-military party sufficiently strong to serve as a buffer against non-conservative parties. Likewise, the Sudanese military resisted massive popular mobilization and calls for democratization. The Sudanese military only reluctantly agreed to form a transitional council, on which it holds half the seats, after heavy international pressure. Like the Thai military, the lack of a developed partisan ally pulls the Sudanese military into politics to directly protect its interests during the transition.

By understanding that a military’s support for democratization is partially dependent upon its confidence in political parties, we should do more to incorporate the party-military relationship into analyses of the political behavior of the military more generally. For example, are militaries more willing to use force in responding to popular protests if the incumbent regime leader or party are not endowed with a strong and institutionalized party organization? We can also ask why some militaries choose to build parties, and why some are more effective at building parties than others. Overall, my theory and findings justify greater attention to the party-military relationship in authoritarian regimes, and also new democracies, to better explain political development.
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