

Putting on the Civilian's Uniform: Understanding Authoritarian Legacies in Civilian-Military Relations

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Abstract

Authoritarian regimes pass on certain legacies to subsequent democracies. Specifically, the institutionalization of authoritarian incumbent parties shapes the strategies of former military officers who seek political office, whom I call legacy officers. When authoritarian incumbent parties are more cohesive and autonomous, these former officers struggle to advance within the party. This leads them to leave the party and form their own. When incumbent parties have weaker mobilization capacity, this opens space within the party system for new parties formed by legacy officers. Party system fragmentation potentially erodes institutional checks on leaders, while also increasing the number of retired officers in government. When the incumbent party is institutionalized, the costs of competing against it are higher for legacy officers, which makes winning political office for legacy officers more difficult. I illustrate this with the cases of Indonesia and Paraguay, which democratized following military-backed authoritarian rule, but whose incumbent party's institutionalization varied.

Both Indonesia and Paraguay democratized following over thirty years of military-backed authoritarian rule. As is common in former military regimes, retired officers in both have sought political office. Yet officers have been far more successful in the former than the latter. In both Indonesia and Paraguay retired officers initially pursued power through the established former ruling party (authoritarian incumbent party) which had survived democratization. In Indonesia, however, former officers have become commonplace in the party system. They have done this by trying to capture leadership of the former ruling party, winning the presidential nomination of established parties, establishing their own parties, and mounting successful or near successful bids for the presidency. The presence of these retired officers has led to significant influence of the military in civilian politics, including deleterious effects on the country's democratic health. In Paraguay, by contrast, former officers have failed to gain the nomination of the incumbent party or successfully challenge the former ruling party in elections. Thus, the military has remained subordinated, without undermining democratic consolidation. What explains the large presence of these former officers within the Indonesian party system, yet the limited presence in Paraguay?

The degree of institutionalization of the authoritarian incumbent party affects the political behavior of former officers who wish to contest politics. Party institutionalization can vary along two dimensions, internal and external institutionalization. When a party is autonomous from other actors, has a more cohesive membership, as well as an established bureaucratic structure to conduct party business, its internal institutionalization increases. What affects the external party institutionalization is the breadth of the territorial organization and the types of links the party has with society. External party institutionalization will be higher in parties when there are local offices spread throughout the country's territory, and the party has strong ideational links with society.

These two dimensions of institutionalization affect the behavior of former officers by imposing costs on their ability to advance within the party, as well as mobilize voters should

they choose to form alternative parties. Often, officers align themselves with the incumbent party following democratization because of their relationship with the party during authoritarianism. When there is a high degree of party cohesion and control of career advancement or nominations, however, officers find it difficult to advance their political career interests within the party, as civilians block their access to leadership positions or nominations. Being blocked within the incumbent party creates an incentive for them to leave the party and seek to build their own. Yet if the authoritarian incumbent party is more institutionalized, as Paraguay's Colorado Party, the costs to carve out a significant constituency and mobilize voters during elections are higher, making winning political office more difficult. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the weakness of the Golkar party gives former officers greater opportunities within the party system. Because Golkar had weaker ties to society, alternative parties were more viable. This meant officers, who had left the party, were more capable at winning significant shares of the electorate and gaining representation in the legislature and executive branch.

This question is pertinent to nearly all cases of post-military rule where former officers are politically active. The behavior of former officers is important to help better understand the legacies of military rule on democratic development. Military rule elevates the political prospects of those within the officer corps, who otherwise wouldn't have a route into politics under civilian authoritarian rule. Military officers are also unlike other civilian elites. This is because officers are typically trained in areas of defense and warfare, with limited to no experience in politics. These former officers may undermine democratic development because they have weak ties to political parties or civil society, and are often not embedded in more traditional political networks or institutions. Ambitious officers who seek political power after democratization must adapt and pursue power via traditional democratic institutions, such as parties and elections. Yet when these institutions present a check to their political ambitions, former officers may attempt to undermine them to increase their personal power, resulting in weakened vertical and horizontal checks on the government.

To evaluate how former officers' political behavior is affected by authoritarian incumbent parties, I use the cases of Paraguay and Indonesia. I select these two cases because the military was heavily involved in politics for decades during authoritarian rule. Despite the lack of a strong historical democratic tradition, both countries democratized after over 30 years of authoritarian rule and have experienced durable democratic rule since the fall of these authoritarian regimes. In both Indonesia and Paraguay, the former ruling party has played a significant role within the party system. Both cases allow me to evaluate the legacy of authoritarian civilian-military relations on the development of democracy, as former officers in each sought power within the party system following democratization. The incumbent parties of the two cases, however, differ in their institutionalization, which shows how the political prospects of former officers is shaped by the institutionalization of the authoritarian incumbent party.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review the literature on authoritarian legacies and civilian-military relations. I then turn the analytical focus to the behavior of former officers, and outline my theory of how party institutionalization shapes officers' political strategies when entering party politics. I next outline my research design and then use the cases of Paraguay and Indonesia to evaluate my argument. The final section concludes with a brief discussion of the results and possible steps forward with this new theoretical framework.

Democratization and Authoritarian Legacies

Over the past twenty-five years a large literature has emerged which focuses on the legacies of authoritarian rule. This turn in comparative authoritarianism and democratization was largely spurred by, Bratton and van de Walle¹ who argued that patterns of democratization were linked to the authoritarian institutions in the regimes undergoing democratization. More recently, the focus on authoritarian legacies has turned towards the role of parties. Grzymala-Busse² first showed that the degree of professionalization of ex-ruling parties in

former Soviet or Soviet-aligned party systems affected their ability to adjust to the new democratic system, which, in turn, affected the stability and composition of the democratic party system. Highlighting the role of authoritarian legacies on the development of democratic parties, both Lebas and Riedl³ show how patterns of authoritarian contestation influenced the formation and institutionalization of democratic parties and party systems which are access points for the former authoritarian elite.

The vast field of civilian-military relations⁴ has yet to examine party institutional legacies within civilian-military relations. Work done by Hunter⁵ and Stepan⁶ opens the door to understanding some legacies of military rule by creating a framework for explaining how military prerogatives are contested after democratization. This work shows how military prerogatives can be contested and scaled back following a transition – demonstrating how civilians can erode or eliminate one particular legacy of military rule.

Other literature focuses largely on reforms to the military or security sector more generally.⁷ This literature highlights the difficulties of exerting civilian control of the previously politically active security sector. Much of the literature on civilian control focuses on the threats that a government or regime faces.⁸ Explanations of civilian control of the military, however, often ignore the strength of domestic institutions, which are instrumental in constraining the military. This was highlighted by Staniland⁹ who demonstrated that threats may matter, but, all else equal, the strength of civilian institutions is a key factor in explaining variation in civilian control of the military. These frameworks are useful for explaining many facets of civilian-military relations, especially for new democracies, but they are ill-equipped to address how civilian-military relations during authoritarian rule, especially the elevation of officers into politics, affects democracy.

Setting the Terms of Contestation

To begin establishing a framework for analyzing the legacies of authoritarian civilian-military relations, I begin by setting the scope conditions of my account. First, I focus on author-

itarian regimes that have elevated military officers into positions of political power. This focuses on cases where civilian control of the military is weak and the military is active in politics. Second, my analysis focuses on cases where actors from the regime have survived democratization and have the opportunity to continue to contest power.¹⁰

What are the factors that affect the behavior of officers who participate in politics? I focus specifically on the participation of former officers, who I term *legacy officers*, in party politics. These are officers who were active during authoritarian rule, but who retired and then sought political office. Legacy officers may have multiple paths to public office available to them, such as positions in the cabinet or sub-national political office, but the most prominent path to power runs through parties that contest elections.

I focus on legacy officers because their choices have unique implications for the development of a democratic system and because they differ from other former authoritarian elites. Officers are trained on issues of warfare and socialized within an officer corps that does not necessarily concern itself with governance and political performance. Due to their links to the military, legacy officers may be more likely than their civilian counterparts to accept an elevated political role for the military and weakened civilian control over the military. Not only do they lack training or socialization typical of civilian political elites, their position as officers means they usually lack links to civil and political society as well. These weaker links to civil and political society could impact the health of democracy if it results in decreased horizontal and/or vertical accountability.¹¹

What, then, shapes the incentives and strategies of these legacy officers? Because of the centrality of parties in various dimensions of democratic politics (elections, legislation, the presidency) the interaction of legacy officers and political parties is key to explain patterns in legacy officers' incentives, and thus, their strategies. In short, following democratization, political parties stand between legacy officers and power. To gain power, legacy officers must go through or around parties, if they hope ever to win office. This can put them at odds with the democratic system, as parties can present an institutional constraint to their political

ambitions.

The primary party that influences the strategies of legacy officers is the authoritarian incumbent party. A party qualifies as the authoritarian incumbent party if it held a majority of seats in the run-up to democratization and then survives the transition to compete in elections during the democratic era. Because these parties survive democratization, they anchor the subsequent party system.¹² I specifically focus on the incumbent party, not solely because it represents an institutional link to the prior authoritarian regime, but also because legacy officers may have cultivated a relationship with it. This relationship is key in shaping legacy officers' strategies. As part of the authoritarian coalition, ruling parties and militaries work side-by-side to maintain authoritarian rule. This means that elites within both organizations may coordinate their behavior and establish a close relationship. With a relationship established during authoritarian rule, officers have an easy path to political office through this party.

Not only do the party and military have a close working relationship under authoritarian rule, but they are also likely to share a common ideology or political outlook. Militaries often come to power in response to some crisis and, in the ruling party, find compatriots in the struggle that cross-cuts the civilian-military divide. For example, members of the ruling party may be ardent nationalists and share with the military, a common vision of the national project. This makes the party attractive to former officers who desire to associate with like-minded civilians.

Given the relationship that often exists between the party and military, how then does the authoritarian incumbent party affect the strategies of legacy officers? To answer this question I use the concept of party institutionalization. I conceptualize party institutionalization along two dimensions, internal and external. First, internal party institutionalization is the extent to which parties are stable organizations¹³, have acquired routinization,¹⁴, internal cohesion,¹⁵ and autonomy from other actors.¹⁶ The external component of institutionalized parties deals with its territorial breadth,¹⁷ and the strength of links to society.¹⁸

The institutionalization of the authoritarian incumbent party influences the strategy of legacy officers by affecting both intra-party and inter-party dynamics. The degree of institutionalization of the ruling party influences the party's autonomy from legacy officers, its ability to control who can be a member of the party, as well as career advancement within the party (intra-party contestation). The party's institutionalization also affects the costs other actors face when competing against it in elections. This structures the opportunity costs elites face when considering defecting from the authoritarian incumbent party (inter-party contestation). More institutionalized parties with strong social-linkages have a greater ability to distinguish themselves from alternative parties and mobilize their supporters. These intra- and inter-party mechanisms shape the strategy of retired legacy officers who contest elections and whether they pursue political power through the authoritarian incumbent party or alternatives to that party.

Concerning the first mechanism, the authoritarian incumbent party's institutionalization affects its autonomy from legacy officers by affecting its control over internal dynamics, or party discipline and its ability to control promotions within the leadership hierarchy and membership to the party. Because party building is costly, legacy officers initially seek to affiliate with a party in hopes of accessing power. Yet well-institutionalized parties set the terms of membership and leadership. This means that legacy officers from the antecedent authoritarian regime who are not members of the party cannot simply enter and participate within the party at will. Instead, they must meet the criteria set by the party.

Legacy officers may react to these constraints by trying to de-institutionalize the party. After joining the party, they may try to build a faction within the party to challenge party incumbents' control of leadership committees. If internal party institutionalization is high, however, party discipline will be strong and the party will rebuff these efforts.

This means that if these legacy officers continue to seek leadership positions within the party, or to capture the nomination for the state's executive, the party must assent. Should the party be weak, however, powerful legacy officers may use their resources, or their clique

of officers, to alter the balance of power within the party and capture it, turning the party into a personal vehicle to pursue power.

When the degree of institutionalization is sufficiently high that the party has autonomy from legacy officers, the officers should be more likely to leave the party and work to build their own. They do this because building and leading their own parties removes some roadblocks put in place by established parties. Most importantly, by building their own parties, legacy officers assert direct control over who sits in positions of leadership. Also, as the leaders of their own party, they are in a prime position to direct recruitment and build party membership that is supportive of their goals - including nominations for political office. Should the party be in a position to have some bargaining leverage in the formation of a government or legislation, a legacy officer who leads a party holds considerable sway over the party's decision making in these instances.

Regarding the second mechanism, institutionalization increases the costs of competing in elections for legacy officers who choose to leave the party. How does the institutionalization of the party increase the costs of competition within the party system? Parties are far more difficult to build than to simply establish. Institutionalized parties have staying power and hold a stable share of the electorate.¹⁹ This happens because more institutionalized parties have durable and thick links to society which legacy officers lack.²⁰ These social links reduce the potential for voters to oscillate between or become attached to alternative parties. Yet these links are costly to form, which effectively shrinks the share of the electoral pie for parties formed by legacy officers. Institutionalized parties also have their own independent and sustainable financial resources. With these resources, the party can target voters and mobilize more effectively than less institutionalized parties.

Institutionalized authoritarian incumbent parties also boast more professional staff. This professional staff has experience in managing elections during authoritarian rule and increases the party's electoral clout as it adapts to democratic competition.²¹ Parties established by legacy officers are more likely to lack professional staff with previous electoral experience,

which makes performing well in elections more difficult. An institutionalized incumbent party is also more likely to carry with it its own distinct brand. This makes the party more distinguishable from other parties²² and it will be difficult for legacy officers, who share a similar outlook with the incumbent party, to set themselves apart and appeal to voters.

Because an institutionalized party has stronger and more durable links to society, as well as more resources to mobilize potential voters, these parties reduce space within the party system for alternative parties by increasing what Tavits terms environmental hostility – or the costs of entering and competing against established parties.²³ While legacy officers can build parties and enter to compete against established and institutionalized parties, doing so will be extremely costly with a lower likelihood of success. Should the incumbent party have strong links to society, this positions the institutionalized party as a stronger player within the system which can influence the terms to which aspiring politicians will compete for political power.

Institutionalized incumbent parties may raise the costs of electoral competition beyond what they achieve via their durable links to society, professionalization, or brands. Where there is an institutionalized authoritarian incumbent party, the opposition has a strong incentive to coordinate and invest in institutionalizing their parties to compete against the incumbent party.²⁴ The result is a relatively polarized party system in which ambitious elites face a stark choice - align with the incumbent party or join the established opposition. In the end, an institutionalized authoritarian incumbent party will be more effective at setting the terms of contestation within the party system than a weaker incumbent party²⁵ and increases the costs of competing in elections for legacy officers.

I note that a party can vary in the degree of institutionalization along the two axes of intra and inter-party institutionalization. Parties may develop factors that grant a high degree of control of intra-party contestation, such as the formation and routinization of party committees, internal cohesion, and firewalls which protect the party from internal factions.²⁶ Despite this internal strength, the party may have weak institutional linkages with society

that are fundamental to setting the costs of electoral competition. Even if the party has a high degree of internal control, it may lack a distinct electoral brand, rely on clientelistic linkages to society, or lack territorial breadth, which limits its power to mobilize society on its behalf.

Should parties be less developed along either axis, they will struggle to increase the costs that legacy officers face sufficient to deter the officers from challenging the party. This opens the door to alternative paths to power should legacy officers seek to chart their own path, rather than accept the terms of the established authoritarian incumbent party. Should the party maintain control of its internal nomination and career paths, yet fail to drive consolidation within the party system, these legacy officers can exit the party and start their own parties to escape restraints imposed by traditional civilians.

Because incumbent parties, including the authoritarian incumbent party, are not sufficiently strong to deter legacy officers, these new parties established by legacy officers, have a reasonable path to power on their own terms. This results in a higher degree of party system fragmentation, with parties formed by legacy officers competing against the incumbent party for voters' support. Thus, even unintentionally, legacy officers contribute to the fragmentation of the party system and potentially undermine the health of the new democracy. This argument can be summarized below, in Table 1.

		Internal Party Institutionalization	
		Low	High
External Party Institutionalization	Low	Robust Presence of Legacy Officers	Presence of Parties Founded by Legacy Officers
	High	Incumbent Party Captured by Legacy Officers	Legacy Officers Excluded from Politics

Table 1: Party Institutionalization and Legacy Officers

Weakness in the incumbent party also opens the door to legacy officers who espouse anti-democratic norms. Some officers prefer a strong armed approach to achieve their political goals, rather than pursuing power through democratic institutions. Thus, openness in the party system increases the potential of these legacy officers to challenge democratic institutions, such as free and fair elections.

I note here that the degree of institutionalization of the authoritarian incumbent party is not the only factor that influences the openness of the party system. Other factors, such as electoral rules and the presence of multiple social cleavages may also play a prominent role, and could lead to a more or less fragmented system. But, all else equal, a more institutionalized authoritarian incumbent party should be more electorally successful and reduce the space in the system for other parties, including those created by legacy officers. In sum, my argument produces the following two hypotheses:

1. **Incumbent Party:** As the authoritarian incumbent party becomes more internally institutionalized, *legacy officers* will become more constrained within the party.
2. **Party System:** As the authoritarian incumbent party becomes more externally institutionalized, its will be more effective at electoral mobilization and lead to lower rates of success for *legacy officers*.

Methodological Approach

To illustrate how the degree of institutionalization shapes the behavior of legacy officers, I compare the cases of post-democratization Indonesia and Paraguay. A qualitative approach allows me to draw on rich contextual data collected during field work performed in these two countries. I developed the data used here through elite-interviews, archival data, and a dataset I created by coding the CVs of regime officials and military academy yearbooks. This micro-level data allows me to track the career paths of military officers prior to and following democratization, including whether they switched parties. A qualitative approach also allows

me to code the degree of institutionalization of the parties in question. Data collected via archival work and interviews demonstrates the degree of discipline within the party, the parties' autonomy from legacy officers, the development of party infrastructure, and the strength of links to society. I use a process tracing approach to explain the development and degree of institutionalization of the parties of interest, and then how this institutionalization affected the behavior of the legacy officers.

I select these cases because of the similarity in the structure and duration of the authoritarian regimes that preceded democratization. Both countries experienced over thirty years of authoritarian rule, which Geddes, Wright, and Frantz²⁷ characterize as a "triple-threat" regime with a personalistic ruler buoyed by support of a ruling party and military. Both systems had legacy officers who were politically active during authoritarian rule and continued their activity following democratization. These legacy officers competed in similar electoral systems as well. Both cases employ a single-tiered PR system where legislative seats are contested in multi-member districts. Both systems are also presidential, with Paraguay's president elected via simple plurality. Indonesia's presidential elections are a bit more complicated,²⁸ but the rules still produce the incentives to cultivate a plurality to win the election. Thus, on these key dimensions Indonesia and Paraguay are similar. A key difference between the two cases, however, is the degree of institutionalization of the authoritarian incumbent party; where Paraguay's Colorado Party is much more institutionalized than Indonesia's Golkar Party.

I also select Golkar in Indonesia because it demonstrates that institutionalization is not static and can develop over time. As the case of Golkar will show, there was little autonomy of the party from legacy officers during the authoritarian period. This allowed officers to participate freely in politics, without any civilian party to restrain them. This case shows that the party, however, was able to develop over time and established greater autonomy from the legacy officers who sought to use the party to advance their political interests. This institutionalization allowed the party to break away from legacy officers during authoritarian

rule.

The Historical Development and Institutionalization of Indonesia's Golkar

To examine how the degree of institutionalization affects the behavior of legacy officers, I start by focusing on the historical development of the ruling parties. I begin with the historical background of Indonesia's Golkar which developed during Suharto's New Order (1965-1998) and continues to play a prominent role in Indonesian politics today.

The post-colonial democratic period of Indonesia was plagued by political, economic, and security instability. Despite Indonesia's first president Sukarno's attempts to maintain civilian democratic rule, the instability enticed political pressure from the military. Seeing parties as a source of instability, Sukarno turned to what he called "functional groups", which were corporate units representing specific social, economic, and military factions.

Under this corporatist model, the military moved to bring nationalists under a single umbrella to boost their political power within the corporatist legislative institution. To coordinate the nationalist functional groups, the military created what was called Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (*Sekber Golkar*) or the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups in 1964. *Sekber Golkar* was the predecessor to the ruling party Golkar, and was created and managed under military leadership. *Sekber Golkar* initially was comprised of ninety-seven functional groups but would grow to over two hundred during the first several years of its existence. Civilians were part of leadership committees, but the central governing body's primary leadership positions were all staffed by active military officers. This large number of functional groups and military leadership meant there was a low degree of internal cohesion and *Sekber Golkar* had no autonomy from the military.

Despite Sukarno's pivot to the corporatist model, Indonesia's path towards crisis continued as the relationship between the communists and the military worsened. This culminated in a failed coup attempt by communists within the military on September 30th of 1965, during which the communists killed six of the top seven military officers. The response to the

attempted coup was swift and brutal. The military immediately stepped in, and took control of politics for the next three decades.

The military saw itself as a protector of the 1945 constitution which was established following Indonesia's declaration of independence from Dutch colonial rule. Thus, the military allowed the institutions established in the constitution to survive, but it worked to reform them in a way that would support a new political order. To create political stability, the military focused its political reforms on the party system. In the reformed party system, *Sekber Golkar* was transformed into a ruling organization that continued to incorporate nationalist-military aligned sectors of society. *Sekber Golkar* was a conglomeration of functional groups, but it functioned essentially the same role as a ruling party. A few years after the rise of the New Order regime, the military reformed *Sekber Golkar* to become a more cohesive organization.

After countering the communist threat, the military began reforming *Sekber Golkar* first by developing routinization and a more functional governing structure. This was conducted in the first congress of the organization in which leadership defined the mission of *Sekber Golkar* and created an action program, a plan to consolidate the functional groups, a plan to recruit and initiate new cadets, and a daily oversight board.²⁹

In the next national meeting of the functional groups, there were some minor reforms by bringing more of the organization under the daily executive committee and giving more power to the chairman. At this point, however, the organization lacked direction and initiative largely because the military hadn't decided that *Sekber Golkar* would become a major part of the regime. This changed, however, as demands for elections grew and the military tried to figure out how to manage elections.

The military began to further institutionalize *Sekber Golkar* in 1969 by consolidating all the functional groups within seven umbrella organizations known as *KINO*, yet there continued to be competition between these *KINO* for power over *Sekber Golkar*. This would change after the regime selected *Sekber Golkar* as the organization which would function

as the regime's electoral machine. In preparation for the 1971 election, *Sekber Golkar* was renamed Golkar, a plan to dissolve the *KINO* to increase internal cohesion was adopted, and all members operated under a single central committee. Golkar also worked to develop a territorial structure that could facilitate campaigning throughout the archipelago. At this time, Golkar was only weakly institutionalized, barely meeting low standards of routinization or internal cohesion, and lacked autonomy from the military.

This reformed structure of Golkar would hold throughout the 1970s. Golkar, however, would develop under the leadership of retired Lt. General Sudharmono in the 1980s. As chairman, Sudharmono oversaw a large developmental program that vastly increased Golkar's infrastructural strength, membership, and professionalization. Sudharmono's goal was to develop Golkar to the point where it could rival the military's political power and exert greater influence within the regime. Under this plan, Golkar recruited and trained up to eight million new members and one million active party cadres at the local level where previously, only the military had had a political presence.³⁰ This meant Golkar was now endowed with a large party apparatus that was present throughout the country and staffed by professional cadres loyal to the party.

The result of this developmental program vastly increased Golkar's institutionalization, and in turn affected its internal dynamics. Due to this program, the party gained greater autonomy from legacy officers and created links to society at the local level. It is important to consider what would have happened to Golkar had its leadership not developed the party in the 1980s as a hypothetical counterfactual. Prior to the end of the developmental program, a majority of leadership positions were still held by legacy officers. Not only did legacy officers control the party at the national level, but they were found throughout Golkar's sub-national apparatus. Had the regime fallen prior to Golkar's development, it would have lacked the internal strength to break away from legacy officers.

Despite the developmental program, however, the conditions of authoritarian rule hampered Golkar's full institutionalization. Because it was created as a civilian instrument of

the military, Golkar didn't develop independent financial revenue streams, instead heavily relying on patronage directed to it by the state. Another issue with Golkar developing under authoritarian rule was the lack of durable and programmatic linkages to society. Golkar had ideational or programmatic links with some sectors of society, but it relied heavily on clientelism, which produced transactional links with society. This would come to limit Golkar's electoral power following democratization, when it had to compete with the other parties that could use their own clientelistic resources to buy support.

Taking on the Party

With the fall of the New Order in 1998, elites, including those within the security sector,³¹ began jockeying for power in the newly opened system. With the military returning to the barracks, political contestation initially centered around two parties, Golkar and PDI-P. Even though Golkar had never become the most powerful actor in the New Order, the retreat of the military and Golkar's development during authoritarian rule greatly altered the future path that legacy officers could take in politics in this new democratic system.

The first move by legacy officers following democratization was to try to capture Golkar. As the face of the New Order regime, Golkar was associated with the collapse of Indonesia's economy through its support for Suharto. Fortunately for Golkar, years of institutionalization provided the party with a well-developed organization, a base of professionalized and loyal party cadres, and a broad territorial structure that survived the fall of Suharto. A key challenge to Golkar's path forward, however, was a transition in party leadership in 1998. This is when legacy officers made their move.

Following the resignation of Suharto and the move to a more democratic system, the leader of Golkar at the time, Harmoko, stepped down to help the party break from the Suharto past and renew itself for democratic competition. This meant that new leadership was to be selected through a party congress. At this party congress, a clique of legacy officers moved to capture the party leadership.

A former elite officer, Edi Sudradjat, led the faction of legacy officers. Edi had served as the commanding officer of the Indonesia Army, head of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and was serving as the Minister of Defense and Security at the time of Suharto's resignation. Edi immediately entered the political arena and challenged a civilian, Akbar Tandjung, for the chairmanship of the party.

Tandjung had joined Golkar in the 1970s after years as the head of a student activist organization. Over twenty-five years within the party, Tandjung rose through the ranks and served in prominent civilian positions within the government and the party's leadership committee. With the fall of Suharto, Tandjung saw a need to save Golkar and lead it into a new era as a democratic party. To do this, however, he needed to defeat the military faction and ensure that Golkar survived as a civilian party with complete autonomy from the military.

Despite Edi's prestige and experience, Tandjung was able to win the chairmanship of the party and steer Golkar's reforms. One factor that helped Tandjung was the developmental program implemented in the 1980s, which increased Golkar's internal institutional control. This program recruited and trained thousands of civilian cadres who were loyal to the party and not the military, while displacing the military's hold on the party at the local level. Following the fall of Suharto, Tandjung was able to marshal support from this civilian foundation built in the 1980s to defeat Edi and break Golkar from the military.

Overall, the institutionalization of Golkar accomplished during the latter-half of the New Order provided the party with the means to survive the transition, maintain its civilian composition, and remain cohesive despite the turbulent fall of the New Order. Despite the popular movement against the New Order regime, Golkar transitioned with a strong civilian core intact. This can be seen in Table 2 which shows the percentage of Golkar's leadership and representation in the legislature that is comprised of retired career military officers. This data was tabulated using the CVs of members of party leadership and all members of the legislature.³² Prior to the fall of the regime, a significant fraction of Golkar's leadership and

members of the legislature were former officers, yet the share of former officers dropped dramatically after the transition and Tandjung's ascension to the chairmanship.

Table 2: *Legacy Officers* in Golkar

Period	Leadership	Legislature
Cycle prior to Democratization	29.5%	13.4%
1 st cycle post-Democratization	12.9%	0.8%
2 nd cycle post-Democratization	6%	4.7%

Legacy Officers Toe the Golkar Line

Tandjung's success had consequences for legacy officers who sought to win political office. Seeing that they could not capture the party, these officers now faced the decision to either align themselves with the party and subordinate themselves to party institutions, or to form their own party and pursue power outside of Golkar. As I will show, some legacy officers chose to form their own parties, while others who initially chose to pursue office through Golkar eventually left the party to form their own party when the path to power via Golkar was limited or blocked.

Edi's loss to Tandjung demonstrated that he would either have to toe the party line or look outside the party. Having failed to take the chairmanship of Golkar, and locked out of power within the party, Edi decided to leave Golkar. Months after his defeat within Golkar, Edi formed the Justice and Unity Party (PKP), positioning it as a more ideal nationalist alternative to Golkar. Edi's decision had little effect on Golkar. This can be seen as only two of PKP's four total seats in the 1999 election were former members of Golkar. Simply put, Edi's defection imposed little cost on Golkar, as the more institutionalized party experienced only a minor problem with a challenger party that was little more than Edi's personal vehicle. Despite Edi's prestige, he was unable to peel away support from within Golkar towards his new party demonstrating a significant degree of loyalty by those in Golkar to the party.

Only a few years later, Golkar would experience another fight within the party featuring prominent legacy officers. In the run up to the 2004 general election, Golkar was immersed in a battle between elites to capture the party's nomination for president. Former officers Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto participated in this battle for Golkar's nomination. Wiranto had risen to prominence through the military after graduating first in the army's academy class in 1984 and later became the commander of the armed forces in 1997, and was in this position when Suharto resigned. Wiranto became politically active soon after Suharto's fall and was the vice-presidential candidate for the failed presidential bids of both B.J. Habibie (first president after Suharto) and Tandjung in 1999. ³³

Following a brief stint in the cabinet, Wiranto became active in Golkar politics and sought the presidential nomination of the party in the run up to the 2004 election. Wiranto defeated Tandjung, Prabowo, eventual party chairman Aburizal Bakrie, and media mogul Surya Dharma Paloh. But as Golkar's nominee, Wiranto lost in the first round of the presidential election to eventual winner Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and runner-up Megawati Sukarnoputri.

After losing the presidential contest, having no power within the party's leadership committees, and seeing little chance for success under the Golkar label, Wiranto left the party and formed his own party, Hanura. Like Edi's PKP, Hanura has struggled to compete against the more established parties within the system, winning only a few seats in the 2009 and 2014 elections and failing to win any seats in the latest elections. Despite Hanura's impotence as a political party, Wiranto has continued to be active in politics and is the Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs at the time this article is written – holding considerable sway over the behavior of Indonesia's security institutions.

Another prominent officer who pursued power through Golkar was Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo's grandfather was the founder of a large Indonesian bank. Prabowo's father served as a prominent economist under Suharto and played a large role in the developmental program pursued by Suharto over his 30 years in power. Prabowo's brother, Hashim Djojjo-

hadikusumo, is also an extremely wealthy businessman and has provided significant financial resources to support Prabowo's political career.

Prabowo's marriage to Suharto's daughter and his rise through the ranks to become a commander in the Indonesian special forces further helped his rise to power within the former authoritarian regime. His links to non-military elite have boosted his influence on Indonesian politics. Instead of relying solely on his status as a legacy officer like Wiranto or Edi Sudradjat, Prabowo's family's elite status boosted his influence.

As with Wiranto, Prabowo initially sought power through Golkar. As previously mentioned, Prabowo challenged both Wiranto and Akbar Tandjung for the party's nomination in 2004 but was easily defeated. As with Wiranto, there was little room for Prabowo's ambitions within Golkar as remaining within the party would require Prabowo to toe the party line.

The strategies of Edi, Prabowo, and Wiranto each followed a similar logic. Each entered Golkar and sought to rise through the party. Their paths forward within the party, however, were determined by civilian party cadres. The internal cohesion of civilians within Golkar, which was a result of its institutionalization during the former regime, enabled it to control the political prospects of legacy officers. Golkar's lack of strong social linkages, however, opened space within the political system for legacy officers who could match Golkar's financial capabilities.

How Legacy Officers Sought Power Outside Golkar

After losing to Wiranto in Golkar in the 2004 electoral period, Prabowo left Golkar and joined Golkar's primary rival, the PDI-P. Prabowo ran as Megawati's³⁴ vice-presidential candidate in 2009 when they lost to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – the incumbent president. After this defeat, and with no chance at gaining power within PDI-P, as he had experienced in Golkar as well, Prabowo founded his own party, the Great Indonesia Movement Party or Gerindra. As the head of Gerindra, Prabowo has had a profound impact on Indonesian

politics, running for president in both 2014 and 2019.

Prabowo has been able to mount two serious challenges for the presidency because of the financial backing of his wealthy family. This allowed him to overcome the obstacles Edi and Wiranto faced, as they lacked the financial resources to match the established party's clientelistic power. During his two presidential campaigns, Prabowo has openly espoused anti-democratic norms and has called for a return to a New Order style government. In the run up to both elections, and immediately following them, Prabowo has challenged the legitimacy of the elections, claiming the system to be rigged against him and has spurred violent clashes against the state. Of all the legacy officers who have entered politics following Suharto's 1998 resignation, it is Prabowo who has most endangered the stability of Indonesian democracy. Frequently running into institutional roadblocks, Prabowo has chafed at constraints on his ambitions and has openly demonstrated his willingness to attack the institutions that stand between him and power.

Where Edi, Wiranto, and Prabowo failed, another legacy officer succeeded. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was another prominent general who held significant power within the military and then in the cabinet following the transition to democratic rule. Yudhoyono rose to prominence within the military by becoming the commander of the military's socio-political office and head of the military faction within the legislature. Following Suharto's resignation, Yudhoyono entered the cabinet, eventually gaining the position as Minister of Politics and Security, one of its most important positions.

Now well established within the political elite, Yudhoyono could pursue higher office and reshape the political landscape. Instead of aligning himself with Golkar, which had recently closed the path off from his mentor, Edi, Yudhoyono chose to form his own party. Yudhoyono formed the Democratic Party in 2001 in preparation for the presidential and legislative elections of 2004. Unlike Edi, Yudhoyono had much greater success with his own party. Yudhoyono had cultivated a distinct brand as a reformer and was one of the key thinkers and leaders in depoliticizing the military. Yudhoyono went on to defeat Wiranto, the

former military commander aligned with Golkar, in the first round of presidential voting in 2004. He then defeated Megawati, the popular daughter of former president Sukarno, in the second round to become president of Indonesia. With the presidency in hand, Yudhoyono's party grew within the legislature and Yudhoyono would coast to reelection in 2009. His party, however, has since declined in prominence now that Yudhoyono can no longer run for president.

The political career paths of these four prominent generals help illustrate how the strategies of legacy officers are shaped by an authoritarian incumbent party. The institutionalization of Golkar during the New Order regime was key to developing its future role in shaping politics following democratization. This institutionalization provided the party with routinization, cohesion, a brand, loyal membership, and roots in society that allowed it to survive the transition. Following the transition, Golkar's civilian membership maintained autonomy from the former military elites, and prevented the party from becoming subjected to legacy officers by controlling *intra-party* contestation.

The historical development of Golkar and its affect on the behavior of legacy officers can be seen in Table 3. Initially weak, both internally and externally, Golkar was dominated by both active and legacy officers. Had the party not developed, it could have easily been captured by legacy officers following democratization. Instead, the developmental program of the 1980s endowed Golkar with a high degree of internal institutionalization which helped civilians within the party take control following the end of the authoritarian regime.

Even though Golkar maintained control of intra-party functions, its inability to constrain the behavior of legacy officers who left or challenged the party shows the limits of its institutional power. When playing by the party's rules was too costly for these officers, they left the party. Since democratization, two legacy officers have successfully challenged the electoral position of Golkar and the other well-institutionalized party from the New Order – PDI-P. The fragmentation of Indonesia's party system has been exacerbated by legacy officers, with

Table 3: Golkar Institutionalization

<i>Onset of Authoritarian Regime</i>	
Cohesion	Low
Routinization	Low
Autonomy	Low
Territorial Breadth	Low
Social linkages	Low
Incumbent party	Legacy officers control Golkar
Party system	Legacy officers control party politics
<i>Prior to Democratic Transition</i>	
Cohesion	High
Routinization	High
Autonomy	Low
Territorial Breadth	High
Social linkages	Low
Incumbent party	Legacy officers well-positioned in Golkar
Party system	Legacy officers use Golkar to gain office
<i>Following Democratic Transition</i>	
Cohesion	High
Routinization	High
Autonomy	High
Territorial Breadth	High
Social linkages	Low
Incumbent party	Legacy officers subject to Golkar
Party system	Legacy officers successfully challenge Golkar

Prabowo and Yudhoyono contributing significantly to this fragmentation. Instead of seeing the PDI-P and Golkar garner larger shares of the electorate over time and consolidate the party system, Prabowo and Yudhoyono's efforts to win political power further fragmented the party system.

What will happen to party politics after the retirement of these generals from politics remains to be seen, but the example of PD is perhaps instructive. Yudhoyono's PD has atrophied since he finished his second term as president. The party is now under the leadership of his son, who lacks his military pedigree and prestige. PD performed poorly in the latest

round of elections – continuing a downward trend for the party. Should this trend continue, it will become a minor party within a few more rounds of elections.

Whether Prabowo’s Gerindra has the staying power of either PDI-P or Golkar remains to be seen. Despite Prabowo’s name at the top of the ticket in the 2014 and 2019 elections, Gerindra has only managed to garner around 12% of the legislative vote – capturing the same share as Golkar, which failed to place a candidate in one of the two presidential candidacies available for the election. Should Prabowo retire from politics following his two failed presidential campaigns, it is reasonable to expect Gerindra’s support to erode quickly without Prabowo at its head and his brother’s financial backing.

Paraguay’s Colorados and Becoming a Ruling Party

The development of the ruling party in Paraguay, the Colorado Party, is quite distinct from Golkar. A key difference between the two is the independent and autonomous development of the Colorado Party from the military. The Colorado Party’s foundation is linked to the complete defeat of the Paraguayan military in the Triple Alliance War. This defeat led many officers who were close to then-president and commander of the army, Francisco Solano López,³⁵ and others who had been exiled in Argentina, to return to Paraguay and begin establishing social clubs after retiring from the military.³⁶ These clubs served as the foundation of parties, and two parties would form – the Liberal Party and the National Republican Association, colloquially known as the Colorado Party.

Initially, these parties were oligarchic parties, weakly tied to Paraguayan society. However, the founders of the Colorado Party, who had served in the military, used their ties to others who had been part of the officer corps to create a territorial organization that reached throughout the Paraguayan territory. Thus, the party functioned as a way to link these comrades-in-arms together, but was primarily concentrated in more densely populated areas and was fragmented throughout the country’s territory. This structure of the Colorado Party would persist for decades and began to change in the 1920s.

After years of Liberal Party rule, activists in the party, led by Juan Manuel Frutos, began developing local links for the party. With a team of party cadres, Frutos spent well over a year establishing local party offices known as *seccionales*. Frutos began this project primarily because he was interested in agrarian reform, and his goal was to build a strong relationship between the party and small towns that depended on agricultural production. The result of Frutos' work was the creation of hundreds of *seccionales* and *sub-seccionales* which tied the party closely to Paraguayan society in urban *and* rural areas. These *seccionales* frequently held local social events, which were published in the party's daily newspaper, provided medical services and other goods, and also conducted normal party business, including the election of a local leadership board which represented the *seccional* to the national party. In short, the presence of these *seccionales* created strong institutional links between society and the party that would later help the party become electorally dominant.

Frutos' work generated a geographically and socially broad constituency for the party, but the party was fractured at the national level until the 1930s. Following the Chaco War with Bolivia in the early-to-mid 1930s, the Liberal Party, which had been in power since 1904, moved to ban all opposition parties. This threat to the Colorado Party spurred collective action among the elites within the party. In March 1936, party elites agreed to reform the central committee, which pulled all local *seccionales* under one committee. During this meeting, the leaders also created a unity pact, in which they agreed that the unity of the party was paramount and that leaders were obliged to uphold party unity.

During this time, Juan Natalicio González developed the party's identity and pitted the party in stark contrast to the Liberal Party. Under this new ideational project, González created the myth that the Liberal Party had been formed by foreigners who were not loyal to Paraguay, but instead to Argentina. He articulated an identity that only Colorados were patriots and that Liberals had betrayed the country. The threat to ban the Colorados and González's work produced a high-degree of cohesion and loyalty to the party, while also creating a polarized and distinct identity for Colorados.

The party developed during its time out of power under decades of Liberal Party rule, and its institutionalization at the national and local level eventually paid off and vaulted the party into power after a bloody civil war in 1947. Prior to the civil war, the Liberals had been expelled from power by the military in the late 1930s. The military lacked political support, however, and eventually brought two of the major parties (Febreristas and Colorados) into a ruling coalition military leadership. The civil war broke out after the president at the time, General Higinio Morínigo, pushed the Febrerista Party out of a coalition cabinet to side completely with the Colorados. The conflict broke along factions of the military loyal to Morínigo and the Colorado Party on the one hand, and the Febrerista, Liberal, and Communist parties and those loyal in the military loyal to these parties on the other. One key to the Colorado Party's victory in the civil war was its ability to marshal its own armed force, using its *seccionales* by recruiting thousands of *pynandi*³⁷ peasant foot-soldiers from throughout the country.

Following the civil war the party would take power and experienced several years of instability until the rise of Alfredo Stroessner in 1954. In 1954 a conspiracy emerged between multiple army battalions and a key *seccional* outside of the capital of Asunción which neighbored the most important military base. This conspiracy effectively amounted to an *autogolpe* in which those within an armored battalion and multiple infantry squadrons would mobilize to consolidate power into President Federico Chaves' hands.

When the leader of the armored battalion mobilized, the commander of the armed forces, Stroessner, received word and confronted Chaves asking why a part of the army had mobilized without his permission. Chaves responded that he, as the Command-in-Chief, had every right to order the move and that he didn't need Stroessner's permission. Seeing his precarious position, Stroessner immediately contacted the executive committee of the Colorado Party, which then coordinated a response to the mobilization with generals loyal to the party who could contain the threat. Having squashed the threat, the party forced Chaves to resign his position as president for failing to uphold the unity pact. After Chaves' resignation, the

committee met to decide on a new candidate for president. The committee was split on whom to select, but eventually settled on Stroessner as a unity candidate; all agreed that Stroessner could serve out the rest of Chaves' mandate and then be replaced with someone from within the party.

After he assumed the presidency Stroessner, unlike previous presidents, toed the party line while in power. Stroessner supported and openly espoused party unity and supremacy throughout almost the entire thirty years in power and never disturbed either the military or party. Under Stroessner, a prominent member of the party who served as his Minister of the Interior for several years, Edgar Ynsfrán, invested heavily in building hundreds more *seccionales* and *sub-seccionales* to increase the party's presence and ties to society. The result was an absolutely dominant party that is present in every neighborhood with members and voters who did not simply affiliate with the party, but identified as Colorados.

Stroessner's Downfall and Ouster

The Colorado Party had developed into a highly institutionalized party in the run up to and further strengthened during Stroessner's tenure. Stroessner's downfall, however, was tied to a rupture within the party. This rupture resulted from the development of a cleavage that split between those loyal to Stroessner, known as *militantes*, and the traditionalists within the party. Conflict between these two factions came to a head in 1987 when the *militantes* took advantage of the traditionalists' trust and barred them from the 1987 party convention, which would be used to elect new party leadership and nominate a presidential candidate.

To recapture the party, the traditionalists found willing allies in the military. As Stroessner became older, the *militantes* and Stroessner had developed a plan to force the retirement of dozens of senior officers to open a path for Stroessner's son, Gustavo, to rise beyond the rank of Lt. Colonel. This upset many within the military, who became sympathetic to the traditionalist Colorado's desire to oust Stroessner. In late 1988 and early 1989, ousted leaders from the Colorados promised political support to the leader of the the army's most

powerful First Division – Andrés Rodríguez.

With this political support, Andrés Rodríguez launched a violent coup against Stroessner and succeeded in ousting him from power. During the coup, Rodríguez promised to act to unify the party and military, which he did. With Stroessner out of power, the *militantes* were expelled from the party, and the traditionalists regained control and oversaw the reunification of the party, returning it to a high degree of internal cohesion. The party then installed Rodríguez as president.

Rodríguez helped the traditionalists recapture the party, but the party was wary of reliving the problems it had experienced in 30 years of supporting a general. Instead of continuing the military-party coalition of the past half century, the party pushed for a shift towards a democratic system, which its leaders were confident they could dominate.

The traditionalists push to regain total control of the party started with internal elections. Following the coup, the party held a new convention to elect its leadership. Key leadership positions were returned to the old guard which had led the party prior to the rise of the *militantes* but who had retired, with the rest of the leadership committees filled with traditionalists. A key difference between this new leadership and prior terms was the complete absence of any active or retired military officers. Where there previously had been one or two retired generals in the leadership committee, the *entire* committee now was staffed by individuals without any experience as career officers.

This push to break away from the military also was reflected in who the party supported for public office. Of the nearly one hundred Colorados who gained seats in the lower and upper houses in the 1989 election, not one of was a retired officer. This carried over into the first democratic election of 1993, which resulted in a legislative delegation of the party comprised solely of civilians without any experience as career officers in the military.

In addition to maintaining a civilian delegation to the legislature, the party fought to control the presidency and keep this office available to core Colorados and away from the military. Their first move to do this was to bar Rodríguez, or anyone from his family, from

being able to run for the presidency again.

Keeping Legacy Officers at Bay

Even with Rodríguez's political power hamstrung, the party wasn't completely free of the interference of officers. One of Rodríguez's main lieutenants, Lino Oviedo, continued to be politically active after the coup and ratification of the new constitution. During the campaign to select the Colorado's presidential candidate for the 1993 election, Oviedo was in talks to initially form a coalition with two other major figures within the party, including Luis María Argaña, to share power in the *Junta de Gobierno*, but eventually the civilians coordinated to lock Oviedo and his clique of officers out of leadership positions within the party.

Locked out of the party's leadership, Oviedo continued to be a nuisance to the party. In 1996 he threatened a coup against the Colorado president at the time, Carlos Wasmosy, who relieved him of his duties. After the threat of the coup abated, President Wasmosy had Oviedo arrested. Although the immediate crisis had been resolved, the Colorado's issues with Oviedo continued. Following Wasmosy's presidency, Raúl Cubas Grau ran for the nomination of the Colorado Party, and having secured it, campaigned on reducing Oviedo's sentence and serving as his proxy in power.

Despite the party's attempt to block Grau from reducing Oviedo's sentence, Grau released him from prison. A new crisis emerged when the party turned on Grau and began the process to remove him from power for his actions regarding Oviedo. By doing so, they would elevate the vice president, Luis María Argaña, who had an antagonistic relationship to Oviedo, into the presidency. This prompted those loyal to Oviedo to react violently, assassinating Argaña before he could become president.

Following Argaña's assassination, Oviedo fled the country, and the lower house impeached Cubas Grau, who immediately resigned. Oviedo remained exiled for several years and, after returning to Paraguay, was arrested and imprisoned. He was eventually released from prison

and cleared of having a role in the assassination of Argaña. Despite his time in prison and exile, he remained politically ambitious. Eager to return to politics, he would have to do so outside of the Colorado Party as he was completely shut out of the party with no hope of reconciliation.

Locked out of Paraguay's strongest party, Oviedo started his own party prior to his return to Paraguay – the National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE). The party was an offshoot of a faction from within the Colorado Party and mimicked the Colorado Party in its structure and ideological positioning. Oviedo would win the UNACE's nomination for the 2008 election and would end up being a spoiler in the presidential election.

Because of its proximity and ties to the Colorado Party, UNACE pulled away significant support from the Colorados in the 2008 election. Oviedo finished a distant third in the presidential election, winning 22% of the vote. The Colorado candidate would finish 2nd with 31%. This was the first time since the fall of Liberal rule in the 1930s that the Colorado Party had failed to win the presidency. UNACE had pulled away enough support that a political outsider, Fernando Lugo, would win the presidency with only 41% of the vote, with the Colorado Party losing control of both chambers of the legislature.

The Colorado Party, however, wasn't out of power for long. Oviedo died in the run up to the 2013 election. Without him at the head, UNACE collapsed and its support returned to the Colorado Party. In the 2013 election the Colorados won the presidency with 48.5% of the vote, along with many of the seats it had lost to UNACE, reestablishing its hold on political power in Paraguay and blocking legacy officers who remain politically active.

The historical level of the Colorado Party's institutionalization and its relationship with legacy officers can be seen in Table 4 below. Due to its high degree of cohesion and autonomy from the military, along with strong links to society, legacy officers were unable to gain a toehold within the party during the authoritarian or democratic era. After democratization, when legacy officers challenged the party, they garnered limited electoral success but failed to overcome the party's ability to mobilize voters.

Table 4: Colorado Party Institutionalization

<i>Onset of Authoritarian Regime</i>	
Cohesion	High
Routinization	High
Autonomy	High
Territorial Breadth	High
Social linkages	High
Incumbent party	Legacy officers subject to the Colorado Party
Party system	Legacy officers gain office through the Colorado Party
<i>Prior to Democratic Transition</i>	
Cohesion	Low
Routinization	High
Autonomy	High
Territorial Breadth	High
Social linkages	High
Incumbent party	Legacy officers subject to the Colorado Party
Party system	Legacy officers gain office through the Colorado Party
<i>Following Democratic Transition</i>	
Cohesion	High
Routinization	High
Autonomy	High
Territorial Breadth	High
Social linkages	High
Incumbent party	Legacy officers subject to the Colorado Party
Party system	Legacy officers fail to challenge the Colorado Party

Summary and Implications

In this article I developed a theoretical framework to understand how legacy officers' political ambitions are constrained by authoritarian incumbent parties. These parties check the ambitions of legacy officers by influencing intra-party and inter-party dynamics. Institutionalized authoritarian incumbent parties control internal dynamics and career advancement within the party. This means that, in these types of parties, legacy officers must toe the party line or leave. When they choose to leave and form their own parties, the strength of

the party affects the space for new parties. When authoritarian incumbent parties are more institutionalized and have stronger links to society, the space for new parties to garner electoral support is limited, thus constraining the legacy officers' path to power through these alternative parties. These constraints limit access for legacy officers to the political system, and reduces the number of legacy officers in government.

Using the post-New Order and post-Stroessner party systems in Indonesia and Paraguay, I show that the authoritarian incumbent party affected the strategies and political prospects of legacy officers. In both cases it was the ruling party, Golkar and Colorado Party, that constrained these legacy officers and shaped their political fortunes following democratization. These parties were sufficiently strong to manage their own internal processes and prevent legacy officers from entering the party and capturing it.

In the case of Indonesia, the authoritarian incumbent party was sufficiently institutionalized to survive democratization and then serve as the gatekeeper into party politics. Following democratization, legacy officers entered the party and sought to use the party as a vehicle to power. Because there was a high degree of internal cohesion and a strong national base, however, these legacy officers were forced to either toe the line or exit. This hadn't been the case during the authoritarian period when, prior to Golkar's institutionalization, legacy officers were prominent within the party. Following democratization, however, when the path to higher office via the party was closed, legacy officers chose to exit. The case of Golkar shows that the relationship between legacy officers and the incumbent party can change over time as the level of institutionalization changes.

In Paraguay, the high level of institutionalization meant that legacy officers had limited success within and outside the party during the authoritarian and democratic periods. Following democratization, politically ambitious officers initially sought to contest elections within the Colorado Party, but struggled to gain power within the party as incumbent civilians blocked their path. In Paraguay, no legacy officer could marshal a sufficiently large following within the party to oust the incumbent leaders due to the party's robust apparatus

staffed by life-long Colorados who were loyal to the party.

Both cases demonstrate that internal cohesion can close off access to legacy officers. Where internal cohesion, professionalization, and discipline are high, a party's autonomy from legacy officers is high. When their path to power via the former ruling party was closed, legacy officers sought to pursue power outside of the party. Again, the strength and institutionalization of the party affected their possible strategies and successes.

Because Golkar had developed during the authoritarian period, it remained in the system as a formidable party that raised the costs of building a party to compete in the party system. This meant the party system wasn't left completely open, and legacy officers could not simply build a personalist party and succeed. Instead, they needed to marshal vast resources to rise to the level of Golkar if there was any expectation of becoming a meaningful party. Golkar, however, lacked the institutional robustness to prevent the rise of challenger parties, which exposed the Indonesian party system to further fragmentation and enabled legacy officers to thrive within the system.

In Paraguay, the strength of the Colorado Party has made winning office difficult for all challenger parties. The strength and durability of the party's links to society through its vast network of *seccionales* imposes high costs on parties that compete against them. When locked out of the party, legacy officers created their own party (UNACE) which failed to garner more support than the Colorado Party, but did draw away sufficient support that it spoiled the Colorado's electoral success until Oviedo's death.

The presence of a stronger authoritarian incumbent party reduces the space within the party system for challenger parties. This holds implications for the behavior of legacy officers. Legacy officers can leave the incumbent party and challenge it, but the strength of the party's linkages to society raises the costs for new parties built by legacy officers. Thus, as the institutional strength of the authoritarian incumbent party increases, it further constrains legacy officers and reduces their effect on party system fragmentation and their success within the party system.

Over the past two decades research on comparative democratization and authoritarianism has turned to focus on the role of authoritarian legacies on the political development of democracies. Whereas previous theories of democratization assumed a clean break from any previous regime, we now recognize that democracies inherit actors and institutions from the preceding authoritarian regime. Recent work has focused more exclusively on legacies passed to democracies via authoritarian incumbent parties, but little work has been done to understand the legacies of authoritarian civilian-military relations on the political development following democratization.

These results highlight the effects of authoritarian incumbent parties on the party system more generally, but they also show that there is a legacy from authoritarian civilian-military relations passed to the democratic system. I show how these parties shape the path of democratic consolidation following the failure of an authoritarian regime by shaping the behavior of legacy officers. Where incumbent parties fail to put barriers to entry for legacy officers, the presence of these former officers in the government increases. With more legacy officers in the government, it increases the number of policy makers who may be more willing to use military force to solve international and domestic dilemmas.

While I show how these legacy officers may interact with an authoritarian incumbent party, the party is not the only actor or institution that may survive democratization. There is certainly more work to understand how various institutions, along with their structures and strength, interact with legacy officers, with their varied characteristics, to shape democratic political development. For example, what affects how or why legacy officers gain positions in cabinets? In this article, I show how the authoritarian incumbent party affects legacy officers' behavior within a party system, yet we know that in presidential systems, the separation of powers reduces the party's control over cabinet appointments. If parties have less control over this process, why do some presidents select legacy officers and place them in prominent positions within their government? Another possible avenue for research is to determine if greater numbers of legacy officers in government actually affects the likelihood

of conflict. Do they perform better or worse than their systems dominated by civilians, or is there no difference? Answering these questions will help us better understand the legacies of authoritarian civilian-military relations.

Notes

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(Cambridge University Press, 2018), doi:10.1017/9781108185950

11. I acknowledge that civilians are not always well-suited for democratic rule, but I argue that former officers carry with them a unique skill set which may affect political development different from civilians.

12. Grzymala-Busse, *Redeeming the communist past: The regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe*; Riedl, *Authoritarian origins of democratic party systems in Africa*; LeBas, *From protest to parties: party-building and democratization in Africa*

13. Samuel P Huntington, *Political order in changing societies* (Yale University Press, 1968)

14. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The rise of competitive authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 51–65

15. Fernando Bizzarro, Allen Hicken, and Darin Self, “The V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index: a new global indicator (1900-2015),” *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 48 (2017), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2968265>

16. Anne Meng, “Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Institutional Strength,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 2017, 1–15

17. Darin Self, “Survival Through Strength: How Strong Party Organizations Help Authoritarian Regimes Survives,” in *Presented at 2018 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting* (2018), <https://dssself.github.io/files/apsa2018.pdf>

18. Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, “Party institutionalization in new democracies,” *Party Politics* 8, no. 1 (2002): 5–29; Daniel Ziblatt, *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2017)

19. Steven Levitsky et al., *Challenges of party-building in Latin America* (Cambridge University Press, 2016)

20. Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal, “Party system institutionalization and party system theory after the third wave of democratization,” *Handbook of party politics* 11, no. 6 (2006)

21. Grzymala-Busse, *Redeeming the communist past: The regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe*

22. Noam Lupu, *Party brands in crisis: Partisanship, brand dilution, and the breakdown of political parties in Latin America* (Cambridge University Press, 2016)

23. Margit Tavits, *Post-communist democracies and party organization* (Cambridge University Press, 2013)
24. LeBas, *From protest to parties: party-building and democratization in Africa*; Riedl, *Authoritarian origins of democratic party systems in Africa*
25. Dan Slater and Joseph Wong, “The strength to concede: ruling parties and democratization in developmental Asia,” *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 03 (2013): 717–733; Darin Self and Allen Hicken, “Authoritarian Legacies and Democratic Party Building,” in *Annual Meeting of the Varieties of Democracy Project* (2018)
26. Ziblatt, *Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe*
27. Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set,” *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 02 (2014): 313–331
28. Initially, Indonesia’s presidential elections featured a multi-round system in which any party could contest the presidency but where the final round only featured two parties. The current system allows only two candidates who must be backed by a coalition of parties within the legislature comprising of at least 20% of the seats.
29. All of this was done under military leadership and *Sekber Golkar* was not under Suharto’s command at this time.
30. A. E. Manihuruk, *Sejarah perkembangan Golkar dan mekanisme keluarga besar Golkar* (D.P.P. Golkar, 1991)
31. John Gledhill, “Competing for change: Regime transition, intrastate competition, and violence,” *Security Studies* 21, no. 1 (2012): 43–82
32. Individuals were coded as either legacy officers or civilians. Individuals were coded as legacy officers if their primary career prior to entering politics was as officers within the military. This was easy to identify as they had graduated from officer school and advanced in rank until their retirement from the military.
33. “Megwati Terjepit, Habibie-Wiranto Lolos,” *Indonmedia.com*, October 1999, <http://www.indonedia.com/bernas/9910/14/UTAMA/14uta0.htm>
34. Megawati was the runner up in the 2004 presidential election.
35. Solano López was killed in battle during the war.

36. These were not parties established by the military. The defeat in war resulted in the complete ruin of the Paraguayan military. Instead, many elites, who had all served in the war because of its scale, retired and founded these clubs.

37. Pynandi is a Guarani word which can be roughly translated to shoe-less.